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1. INTRODUCTION
During the last few decades, the World Bank has become a central actor in shaping the 
global education policy agenda. Since the approval of its first education loan in 1962, 
this international organisation has become increasingly involved in education to the 
point of becoming the largest supplier of external funding to the sector. Importantly, 
the priorities or focus of attention of the World Bank (hereafter also ‘the Bank’ or the 
WB) in education have also evolved. Whilst it was mainly focused on the material 
dimension of the education system (such as school infrastructure, textbooks, material 
assets for workshops and laboratories, and so on), over time, more intangible issues 
including learning outcomes and education quality have gained centrality in the Bank’s 
lending portfolio (Jones, 2007; Mundy and Verger, 2015). As part of this shift, teacher 
policies have also received increasing attention in the Bank’s interventions. This focus 
on teachers on behalf of the Bank has been reinforced over the years following the 
finding of the impact of teachers on student learning outcomes and, accordingly, 
on countries’ economic competitiveness (Robertson, 2012). Thus, by doing so, the 
World Bank joins a broader consensus that has been forged within the international 
development community concerning the key role that teachers potentially play in the 
promotion of quality education for all (Leu, 2005; UNESCO, 2005), and that the well-
known 2007 McKinsey report brought to an end when sentencing that “the quality of 
an education system cannot exceed the quality of its teachers” (McKinsey, 2007: 4).
The prominent role of the World Bank in the global governance of education cannot be 
understood solely on the grounds of its material power. Hence, its capacity to influence 
policy goes beyond its lending activity and also involves a significant “ideational” 
power propagated through the production of knowledge, e.g., publishing of reports, 
academic articles, and policy briefs among other publications (Steiner-Khamsi, 2012; 
Verger et al., 2014). As recalled by Steiner-Khamsi (2012), the World Bank has 
reinvented itself and now operates as a knowledge bank, acting increasingly as a 
“global policy advisor for national governments” and elevating itself “into the role of 
the ‘super think tank’ among the aid agencies that, based on its extensive analytical 
work, knows what is good for recipient countries but also what other aid agencies 
should support” (Steiner-Khamsi, 2012: 5). Similarly, Jones (2007) notes that Bank 
policies in education can be distinguished or identified by two main methods, namely: 
the observation of the accumulation of projects, and the body of different types of 
publications directed to influence common or global understanding of education 
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policy. In their study of the World Bank’s policy on education privatisation, Mundy 
and Menashy (2014) also distinguish between knowledge and lending products. 
Interestingly, they find that there is a disjuncture between the policy discourse and 
the practice of the Bank regarding education privatisation, with an official discourse 
that is more pro-privatisation than the actual operations on the ground.1  
Building on these insights, the main questions that inspire the present study are: How 
are teachers conceived and portrayed in both the World Bank’s knowledge products 
and in the lending projects financed by this organisation? Which are the teacher 
policies most commonly recommended and prescribed in both the World Bank 
publications and operations? Specifically, the objectives of this study are to: 
 1.  Examine how teachers, as well as teachers’ unions, are characterised in 
the World Bank’s knowledge products, or publications, that have been 
released in the last decade, and determine what are the “teacher-related 
issues” most frequently emphasised in them.
 2.  Find out which are the policy prescriptions recommended or advocated 
for in the World Bank’s knowledge products, with a focus on the level of 
consistency or logical correspondence between detected problems and 
proposed solutions. 
 3.  Review the policies and measures concerning teachers as stipulated in 
the World Bank’s lending projects and guidelines (approved since 2005), 
identifying the practices and policy programmes most commonly put into 
practice, as well as those problems intended to be addressed.
 4.  Examine to what extent the World Bank’s operations reflect the discourse 
contained in its more emblematic “knowledge products”, paying special 
attention to possible inconsistencies (as per Mundy and Menashy’s (2014) 
analysis of the education privatisation agenda of the Bank mentioned 
above).
 5.  Based on the above analysis, determine the paradigm of teachers’ reform 
that tends to predominate in the World Bank’s programmes and identify 
the effects of this prevalence. 
1    See also Menashy et al. (2012).
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1.1. Methodology
To achieve these objectives, the present study has employed a content analysis 
methodology, understood as a set of techniques intended to collect information, 
produce indicators, and organise information through a systematic classification process 
of identifying, coding and counting themes, enabling the inference of characteristics 
and meaning from a large corpus of written texts and/or to test previously established 
hypotheses (cf. Bardin, 1996 and Neuendorf, 2002). Taking into account the distinction 
between policy and practice, which is central in the objectives of this research, two 
main types of documents have been selected for analysis: (i) knowledge products, 
published by the World Bank, including policy briefs, technical reports, research papers, 
sector strategies and books; and (ii) lending projects of the World Bank, including 
project appraisal documents for specific investment loans, adaptable programme 
loans and credits, sector development policy loans and credits, additional grants, and 
emergency recovery loans.
The selection of the documents has been based on the following criteria: 
 - Date: references between 2005 and 2014.
 - Education level: primary and secondary education. 
 -  Knowledge products: presence of the term ‘teacher(s)’ in the title or clear focus 
on teachers. Moreover, considering their particularly influential or “ground-
breaking” nature, three additional documents have also been included in 
the corpus: the World Bank Education Strategy 2020, the Systems Approach 
for Better Education Results (SABER)-Teachers Framework documents, and 
the book, Making Schools Work: New Evidence on Accountability Reforms. 
In this booklet, these documents are taken separately and presented in 
independent boxes, although they are also included in the corpus of 
knowledge products collected for the general analysis.
 -  Lending projects: projects included one of the teacher-related categories 
according to the categorisation provided by the World Bank Education 
Projects Database.
A total of 48 knowledge documents and 133 lending projects’ documents have been 
identified according to these criteria (see Appendices 2 and 3). Each document has 
been examined on the basis of a previously set list of categories that has enabled the 
identification of teacher-related problems and their attributed causes, recommended 
or prescribed policies, and inclination toward teachers’ unions. In order to proceed 
with the codification of the selected documents, a repertoire of items and themes 
inductively defined has enabled the identification of those problems and policies more 
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frequently considered in the corpus of reviewed documents. This list has constituted 
the basis for the data collection instrument, under the form of a synthesis matrix 
(see Appendix 4). As part of teachers’ related data, more descriptive data, including 
geographical area, date and ‘genre’ of the document has also been collected with 
the aim of discerning possible patterns based on these features. The synthesis matrix 
used in the process can be consulted in Appendix 1.
The codification process has enabled the quantification of types of predominant 
approaches in the selected documents on a range of teachers’ related matters. In the 
case of knowledge products, this quantification evidences the themes and questions 
that orient the policy and research agendas of the Bank – revealing what this institution 
identifies as the main challenges or “issues” in relation to teachers. Moreover, the 
identification of a range of policy options and the stance taken by the Bank regarding 
these practices reveal the policy preferences of the institution. Similarly, in relation to 
lending projects, the authors quantified the “issues” most frequently requiring the 
WB’s attention and the commonly prescribed policies, both illuminating the Bank’s 
views on the weak points and necessary solutions with respect to teachers. 
1.2. Conceptual framework
Within the international education community there is broad consensus on the key 
role of teachers in the improvement of education systems, yet there is not such an 
agreement concerning which specific types of teachers’ policies and accountability 
measures can contribute to promote quality education more effectively. Scholars, 
such as Cochran-Smith (2000, 2001), Connell (2009) and Zeichner (2003) have 
distinguished between different - and even competing - teachers’ reform agendas, 
including professionalisation, deregulation, over-regulation, and social justice agendas. 
On their part, Maroy (2008) and Maroy and Voisin (2013) have categorised different 
modes of institutional regulation of education systems (namely, bureaucratic-
professional models and post-bureaucratic models, including a quasi-market and an 
evaluative state approach), as well as distinct understandings of teachers’ accountability 
– some of them more supportive of a teachers’ professionalisation agenda and some of 
them more supportive of a deregulation agenda. In the same vein, Mons and Dupriez 
(2010) distinguish between hard, soft, and reflexive accountability policies. Building on 
these notions of teacher development and accountability reforms, four (competing) 
and general teacher policy agendas can be distinguished:2  
 
2  The fact that these categories – which will be used to analyse the documents that are part of the 
research corpus - are grounded on existing literature on teachers’ policy and accountability reforms 
ensures both their theoretical adequacy and their analytical value. 
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 -  Professionalisation agenda. This agenda puts emphasis on pre-service 
and in-service training and practical experience for novice teachers and 
promotion of in-school and peer-based forms of professional development 
and mentorship and induction programmes; preference for selective pre-
service training programmes and high professional qualifications standards; 
teachers’ welfare; labour regularisation, and public recognition.
 -  Competition and/or market agenda. The main measures contemplated 
here are the promotion of contract and/or para-teachers: flexible and 
alternative paths of entrance to the profession and preference for school-
based management (community or school councils enjoying substantial 
decision-making power regarding staff hiring and firing). 
 -  Managerialist or neo-bureaucratic agenda. This agenda emphasises high-
stakes testing and the need for policies facilitating dismissals (probation 
periods, performance-based tenure); promotion of performance-based 
incentives (bonuses, awards, career advancement opportunities and pay) 
and attention to monitoring and evaluation systems and the improvement 
of human resources management; and principals’ decision-making power 
on staff management.
 -  Efficiency driven agenda. This agenda pays attention to teachers’ 
deployment policies (need for hardship bonuses and the revision of transfer 
criteria), contract teachers, emphasis on the optimisation of pupil-teacher 
ratios and promotion of multi-grade instruction. 
To a great extent, these categories will guide our review of the World Bank documents 
and interventions affecting teachers. By identifying and quantifying the WB’s policy 
preferences included in our sample of documents, we will be able to discuss which of 
these different agendas predominates in the Bank’s approach to teachers’ reforms. 
This analysis will be conducted by assuming that a particular constellation of policies 
advanced in the reviewed documents is indicative of the priority given to each one of 
these agendas. However, it is also important to mention that these teachers’ reform 
agendas are conceived as ‘ideal types’ as the authors do not expect them to crystallise 
in a pure form in real situations. Accordingly, in the World Bank’s policies on teachers, 
the authors expect to identify some hybrid agendas or constellations of policies that 
could correspond to rather different reform approaches.
10
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1.3. About this booklet
Overall, this booklet shows that the World Bank does not have a monolithic vision 
on teachers nor does it advocate for a unique package of teacher-related policies. 
The different documents analysed in this review reflect very diverse points of view 
coexisting within this international organisation on the same teacher-related themes 
(such as the contribution of teachers to education quality, the role of teachers’ unions 
in educational reform, and so on). At the same time, different and, at times, conflicting 
teachers’ reforms and policies are advocated by the Bank. Although some common 
patterns can be identified in both knowledge products and lending projects, there is 
an evident tension in the teachers’ conceptions and policies identified across these 
two types of documents. Broadly speaking, it could be considered that the World 
Bank knowledge products reflect a certain preference for a managerialist or neo-
bureaucratic agenda and are especially concerned with teachers’ lack of effort in many 
educational settings. On the other hand, the World Bank’s lending projects seem to 
be more supportive of a professionalisation agenda and place a greater emphasis on 
the necessity of improving teachers’ training. 
This study’s findings also suggest that there is an important degree of regional variation 
in the World Bank’s approach to teachers. For instance, in relation to lending projects, 
the promotion of controversial reforms such as contract teachers, school-based 
management, and performance-based incentives is particularly present in the South-
Asia region, but is not so evident in other regions. The conception of teachers’ unions 
also varies noticeably among the different regions where the Bank operates. Teachers’ 
unions in Sub-Saharan Africa are conceived as a potential ally in numerous World 
Bank publications and projects, whereas these teachers’ organisations are especially 
stigmatised in the World Bank literature on Latin American education. 
This booklet presents these and many other findings in three main sections. In the 
first section, the content of the World Bank’s research products focusing on teachers 
is analysed. The second section concentrates on the analysis of those World Bank’s 
lending projects with teachers’ components. The third and final section discusses the 
main results from a comparative perspective and presents the main conclusions of the 
research. In particular, this last section explores the possible reasons for the observed 
gap between “talk and action” in the World Bank’s approach to teachers’ reforms. 
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2.  TEACHERS IN THE WORLD BANK 
KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTS
Drawing on a corpus of WB knowledge products, this section aims to capture how 
teachers are considered to contribute to education quality, and which policy options 
are recommended to strengthen the link between teachers and education quality. 
Section 2.1 explores the range of “teacher issues” that are considered to impinge on 
education quality, including the preferred explanations of why teachers represent a 
challenge for educational quality in many developing contexts. Section 2.2 deals with 
how the WB’s knowledge products characterise teachers’ unions, and outlines the 
related policy advice for governments on how to engage with this type of organisation. 
Section 2.3 addresses the preferred policy options outlined in Bank publications for 
intervening in a range of teacher-related areas such as teachers’ labour conditions, 
teacher training, and so on. This section ends with a more in-depth discussion of 
three emblematic World Bank documents that directly engage with teachers’ debates. 
2.1. Teachers and quality education: a multi-faceted relationship
2.1.1. A “far from satisfactory” contribution
In general terms, the World Bank literature conceives teachers as key agents in 
students’ learning, but it tends to do so by portraying teachers as poor contributors 
to the quality of education systems, if not ultimately responsible for the limited levels 
of student learning. In fact, one-third of the examined documents make explicit 
reference to the uneven levels of teacher effectiveness or to the effects of individual 
teachers on students’ test scores. One of the central tenets of the Bank is that the 
‘quality’ or ‘effectiveness’ of teachers is the main (school-based) factor affecting 
student achievement.  
  “A series of great or bad teachers over several years compounds these effects and can 
lead to unbridgeable gaps in student learning levels. No other attribute of schools 
comes close to this impact on student achievement” (Bruns and Luque, 2014: 6).3  
  “Quality teachers are one of the most important school-related factors found to 
facilitate student learning and likely explain at least some of the difference in 
effectiveness across schools” (Loeb et al., 2012: 271).
3  Here, the authors remark on the impact of teacher effectiveness on students’ mastery of the curri-
culum, college participation rates, and subsequent income. 
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  “The broad consensus is that teacher quality is the single most important school 
variable influencing student learning (Darling-Hammond, 2000; Rockoff, 2004; 
Rivkin, Hanushek and Kain, 2005)” (Pandey et al., 2008: 13).
  “A number of studies have found that teacher effectiveness is the most important 
school-based predictor of student learning and that several consecutive years of 
outstanding teaching can offset the learning deficits of disadvantaged students” 
(World Bank, 2012: 5).
2.1.2. Lacking professionalism
However, the explanations for the poor quality of teachers and teaching practices are 
quite varied in nature. A first group of “symptoms”, and by far the most frequently 
documented, are those related to the idea of “lack of effort”, “deliberate negligence”, 
or “lack of professionalism” (46.88 per cent of WB knowledge products). Hence, a 
noticeable number of documents 4 conceive teachers as dishonest employees likely 
to have a casual attitude to work. Nearly half of the documents analysed make some 
reference to poor teaching as a consequence of idleness during instructional hours (as 
opposed to a hard-working or industrious attitude), including an intentional loss of 
instruction time, a poor use of available material, a deliberate neglect of responsibilities, 
inactivity or lack of engagement when in the classroom, deliberate absenteeism, and 
unofficial “shortenings” of the school day or week. 
Among these factors, absence rates are at the centre of the World Bank’s discourse 
on teachers’ attitudes. References to non-attendance or absenteeism can be found in 
three-quarters of the reviewed publications, usually regarded as an important factor 
contributing to poor learning outcomes. Thus, the idea of the absent teacher is clearly 
a pervasive one in the Bank’s literature. Two seminal works, repeatedly referenced in 
the reviewed publications, are the most important source of evidence on the matter for 
the Bank, namely, the work of Chaudhury et al. (2006)5 and of Kremer et al. (2005).6
4  If not stated otherwise, knowledge products do not include SABER-Teachers’ country cases. 
5 Chaudhury, N., Hammer, J., Kremer, M., Muralidharan, K., and Rogers, F. H. (2006). “Missing in 
Action: Teacher and Health Worker Absence in Developing Countries.” Journal of Economic Pers-
pectives 20 (1): 91–116, and the variation. Chaudhury, N., Hammer, J., Kremer, M.,  Muralidharan, 
K., and Rogers, F. H. (2004). “Teacher and Health Care Provider Absenteeism: A Multi-Country 
Study.” World Bank: Washington, DC. 
6 Kremer, M., Chaudhury, N., Rogers, F. H., Muralidharan, K., Hammer, J. (2005). “Teacher Absence 
in India: A Snapshot.” Journal of the European Economic Association 3 (2–3): 658–67. Also found 
as Chaudhury, N., M. Kremer, F. H. Rogers, J. Hammer, and K. Muralidharan (2005). “Teacher Ab-
sence in India: A Snapshot.” Journal of the European Economic Association 3 (2–3): 658–67.  
T H E  W O R L D  B A N K ’ S  D O U B L E S P E A K  O N  T E A C H E R S
13
BOX 1. MANAGING INSTRUCTIONAL TIME 
The loss of instructional time is addressed by a number of lending projects, 
constituting a distinct category of problems (see next section). Attention to 
this issue seems to owe much to the work of Abadzi (2007), who spent almost 
30 years as senior education specialist at the World Bank. Abadzi emphasises 
the relationship between instructional time and student achievement, noting 
that “variables measuring curricular exposure are strong predictors of test 
scores and correlations between content exposure and learning are typically 
higher than correlations between specific teacher behaviours and learning” 
(p. 17). Her work draws attention to the fact that, in poor areas, the loss 
of instructional time is particularly striking, and she developed a “time loss 
model” that considers the effect of school closures, teacher absenteeism 
and tardiness, student absenteeism, non-instructional time (organisation and 
management activities) and deviations from prescribed curriculum. Albeit 
admitting that these losses are sometimes legitimate or involuntary, the policy 
guidance recommended by her study emphasises the need for accountability, 
monitoring, and control mechanisms, suggesting that the poor use of time is 
considered the result of a deliberate decision in a context of weak supervision. 
2.1.3. A matter of accountability
In many of the Bank publications, issues of under-performance and deliberate 
absenteeism go hand-in-hand with explanations pointing to the ineffectiveness or 
absence of supervisory structures and, in particular, a lack of accountability systems. 
It is suggested that teachers do not make an effort (or shirk their responsibilities) as 
a consequence of not being held directly accountable for student learning. Up to 
43.75 per cent of the documents allude to a “lack of performance-based incentives”, 
and consider that fixed wages, job stability, and promotions that are unresponsive 
to performance levels demotivate teachers and keep incompetent individuals in the 
profession. Among this group of documents, some call into question permanent tenure 
or open-ended appointments, while others make reference to systems that reward 
credentials rather than performance, absence of performance-based bonuses, or 
pre-arranged and invariable salaries. In fact, the notion of “incentive” (as an element 
likely to encourage good performance and effort) includes a variety of interpretations, 
ranging from monetary and non-monetary rewards to the “fear” of job loss. In any 
case, the perceived harmful effects of uniform and equal labour conditions (regardless 
of performance) emerge as a cross-cutting idea within these documents. The following 
excerpt captures and synthesises this widespread approach: 
14
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  “Most education systems globally are characterized by fixed salary schedules, 
lifetime job tenure, and flat labor hierarchies, which create a rigid labor 
environment where extra effort, innovation, and good results are not 
rewarded and where dismissal for poor performance is exceedingly rare 
(Weisberg and others, 2009)” (Bruns, Filmer and Patrinos, 2011: 18)
While many of the documents point to a lack of accountability to education authorities 
(or to an undefined agent), a second group of documents refers more explicitly to 
an insufficient accountability of teachers towards parents, school communities, or 
local communities. Specifically, 28.13 per cent of the knowledge products point to an 
inadequate monitoring of teachers (and, more particularly, teachers’ attendance) by 
citizens, who are conceived as the ultimate consumers of education. In this narrative, 
it is assumed that the lack of “voice” or feedback opportunities by the so-called 
education clients account for the existence of neglectful teachers. Among other 
issues, these documents refer to a lack of “real” decision-making power (e.g. school 
councils unable to hire and fire school staff), self-perceived disempowerment among 
families (as in the case of parents with low levels of education attainment), or a lack 
of interest/awareness among communities about their own responsibilities concerning 
teachers’ management. 
2.1.4. Mitigating responsibility
Although less frequently than accountability related explanations, an important 
number of the documents (34.38 per cent) consider a range of mitigating factors 
that effect the degree of teachers’ responsibility for their own poor performance 
and non-attendance. These are “extenuating circumstances” affecting teachers 
(i.e. factors beyond teachers’ control) including the effect of school location (rural or 
remote areas), the impact of illness-related factors (particularly HIV/AIDS affecting 
teachers or teachers’ relatives), external obligations (such as electoral duties), the need 
to travel to collect salaries or participate in training, and the impact of second jobs 
(“moonlighting” resulting from low salaries) or double-shift schemes.7  
Importantly, this group of explanations gives rise to a highly polarised distinction 
between two competing approaches regarding teacher absence, as shown in Figure 1. 
7   The consideration of non-deliberate absenteeism or the “refinement” in causal explanations seems 
to be particularly the case for those reports that form part of the collection Africa Human Develop-
ment Series,  produced “in the field” (as opposed to those produced by Washington-based teams or 
researchers). 
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At one end of the spectrum, half of the publications documenting absence rates regard 
them as the result of a deliberate neglect.8 At the other end of the spectrum, another 
half of the publications dealing with teacher absence consider factors that are outside 
of teachers’ control. The existence of these two competing approaches regarding 
teacher absence, and the tension this generates when it comes to the construction of 
coherent policy diagnoses, is well captured in the following excerpt: 
  “In attributing all teacher absence to negative shocks, we have probably 
been overly generous–it is likely that at least some portion of teacher 
absence is due to shirking rather than illness (…) The situation in low-
income countries may be very different. Certainly, studies in India 
(Chaudhury and others, 2005) suggest that teacher absenteeism is largely 
due to shirking rather than illness. Jacobson’s work however, cautions 
us in extrapolating views from one continent to another. If teachers in 
Zambia and other Sub-Saharan countries are absent because they shirk 
and incentive schemes and greater accountability lead both to greater 
attendance and better performance, then such schemes can lead to better 
learning outcomes. However, if teachers’ utility functions are altruistic 
so that most absenteeism is “genuine”, incentive schemes might hurt 
teacher motivation” (Das et al, 2005: 20-21). 
  “One note on terminology: The term ‘absenteeism’ is widely used in this 
literature. In this chapter, we prefer the term ‘absence’, which we view as 
less judgmental, but sometimes use ‘absenteeism’ when referring to high 
levels of apparently volitional absence, or when citing work that uses the 
term” (Rogers and Vegas, 2009: unnumbered).
8  In the present study, the authors consider that this category includes those documents that do not spe-




















FIGURE 1  -  References to teacher absences - Knowlegde products
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2.1.5. The importance of preparation
Deficient teacher training is also often used to explain the poor performance of 
teachers. In this respect, the presence of untrained teachers in the profession appears 
to be the most worrying dimension: up to 28.13 per cent of the reviewed documents 
cite the existence of teachers with lower than officially required credentials, the lack of 
a certification process, or the deployment of so-called para-teachers (i.e. teachers hired 
on short-term temporary contracts who generally lack qualifications and training) as 
problematic. One in four of the documents mentions insufficient and poor quality pre-
service teacher education, aggravated by unavailable or unsatisfactory professional 
development. The explanations for poor training and professional development are 
diverse, including obsolete content and methodologies, poorly equipped educators, 
an excessively liberalised sector, and the non-compulsory nature of in-service training. 
According to 21.88 per cent of the publications, low levels of performance in 
education systems are also explained by the composition of the teaching force. These 
documents regard the teaching profession as unable to attract and retain well-prepared 
individuals. This is a result of teacher training programmes not being selective and/
or the unattractive labour conditions of the teaching profession in most developing 
countries. These explanations suggest that teachers who are already in the profession 
are unable to face the challenges of educating children. 
2.1.6. Management issues and labour welfare
In many of the reviewed documents, teachers are approached from a cost-efficiency 
perspective. A significant number of them emphasise the proportion of education 
budgets allocated to teachers’ salaries or salary related expenditures. Specifically, 
34.38 per cent of the documents highlight these figures, which - although it is not 
always clearly or overtly portrayed as a “problem” - reinforces the idea that countries 
need to strengthen the efficiency of their education systems by paying special attention 
to ‘human resources’.
This latter theme is usually related to the territorial allocation of the teaching force. 
One-fifth (21.88 per cent) of the publications document an uneven distribution of 
teachers, noting the co-existence of shortages in rural or remote areas with oversupplies 
in urban or higher-density areas and emphasising the impact of inadequate transfer 
criteria or deployment policies. Other efficiency related issues such as low pupil-
teacher ratios, light workloads, the proportion of non-teaching staff or excessively 
high salaries receive less attention; combined, they are mentioned in 21.88 per cent 
of the documents. A smaller proportion of publications (18.76  per cent) refer to the 
effects of corruption (including rent-seeking, nepotism and “ghost teachers”) in the 
hiring or deployment of teachers.
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Finally, absolute shortages are also the object of considerable attention, being 
mentioned in 22.6  per cent of the documents. Different factors appear to explain 
insufficient teacher supply, including a restricted output of teacher training institutions, 
the impact of HIV/AIDS, and the effects of unattractive labour conditions. In fact, 
and in connection with the labour conditions, issues affecting teachers’ welfare 
also receive quite some attention: up to 31.25  per cent of the documents highlight 
the harmful effects of low, unpunctual, or irregular remuneration, as well as the 
teachers’ dependence on community contributions for their salaries or a lack of labour 
protection. Interestingly, job insecurity and inadequate consideration of contract 
teachers constitute the exclusive focus of one of the studies. Robinson and Gauri 
(2010) note that Courts (and particularly the Supreme Court) in India appear to be 
increasingly unreceptive towards contract teachers’ claims. The authors emphasise the 
Courts’ uncritical acceptance of the governmental use of contract teachers and their 
adoption of a hands-off position towards economic liberalisation, ultimately resulting 
in a constriction of labour protections (including regularisation, union rights and equal 
pay for equal work) with the argument that they prevent labour liquidity. Although 
this is a rather exceptional perspective in the World Bank context, these assertions 
deserve some attention, considering the allegedly excessive labour protection and, 
as developed below, the uncritical advocacy for contract teachers that prevails within 
this organisation.
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2.2. Teachers’ unions and educational reform
Teachers’ unions/organisations (hereafter also TUs) receive only limited attention 
in the World Bank publications. They are mentioned in over half of the documents, 
but are usually treated as a secondary actor. However, when mentioned, unions are 
generally portrayed in negative terms. In nine documents, unions are overtly regarded 
as contributing to “rigid” labour regulation that prevents improvement in the quality 
of the system, or leads to a higher per student cost. Moreover, some documents regard 
teacher organisations as likely to “jeopardise” the original or genuine intentions of 
a given reform. This is particularly the case for the works authored by Chang et al. 
(2014), Bruns et al. (2011), and Bruns and Luque (2014). In addition, these documents 
conceive of unions not only as a risk or challenge during reform implementation, but 
also as possible contributors to pro-tenure regulation for contract teachers, which 
is something that their authors view as problematic because it distorts the original 
rationale for contract-teacher policies. For instance, Bruns et al. (2011) report how in 
Madhya Pradesh in India, union mobilisation to match contract and regular teachers’ 
employment terms contributed to reducing the expected and desired differential in 
performance incentives between contract teachers and regular teachers. 
The book, Great Teachers, authored by Bruns and Luque (2014), is especially 
informative about the vision and mission of the World Bank concerning teacher 
unions. With a focus on Latin America and the Caribbean, the book devotes an entire 
chapter (titled “Managing the Politics of the Teacher Reform”) to analyse the role 
of teachers’ unions, accompanied by policy/political guidance. As a starting point, it 
is worth noting that unions are explicitly portrayed as having opposing interests to 
those of education administrators and recipients: 
  “Like all organized workers, teachers’ unions exist to defend the rights they 
legitimately earn through negotiations and to oppose policy changes that 
threaten those rights. Teachers and their representatives are entirely justified 
in pursuing these goals (…) [b]ut it is also true that the goals of teachers’ 
organizations are not congruent with the goals of education policy makers 
or the interests of education beneficiaries—including students, parents, and 
employers who need skilled workers” (Bruns and Luque, 2014: 287-288).
The book argues quite plainly that, since unions try to block educational reforms that 
are expected to work in the public interest, the power of unions should be reduced. 
The authors note that since most education reforms threaten unions’ interests (i.e. 
they usually result in a reduction of teachers’ benefits, alter their working conditions, 
or threaten unions’ structure and power), teachers’ resistance must be (primarily) 
understood on the grounds of “special interests pursuing a self-interested agenda” 
(cf. Gindin and Finger, 2013):
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   “LAC [Latin America and Caribbean] countries—like those in other 
regions—pursue a wide variety of strategies for raising education quality and 
improving efficiency. Teachers’ unions resist a number of these, either by 
blocking them from adoption or undermining them during implementation. 
Unions’ resistance to reforms can generally be traced to threats these 
pose to members’ benefits (salaries, pensions, and job stability); their 
working conditions and challenges (curriculum changes, student testing, 
performance evaluation, and accountability pressure); or the union’s own 
survival. Teachers’ unions perceive clearly that policies that impact their 
size or structure—ranging from decentralization proposals to career path 
reforms that differentiate salaries based on competency—can fragment union 
membership and undermine the capacity for collective action, which is a 
fundamental source of union power” (Bruns and Luque, 2014: 288).
At the same time, the introduction of educational reforms needs to be seen, 
inherently, as a strategy to fight against teachers’ organised action. This seems to be 
a priority particularly in Latin America and the Caribbean since, in this region, unions 
are “considered especially strong, with a history of effective use of direct electoral 
influence as well as disruptive actions in the streets to block reforms perceived as a 
threat to their interests” (287).
The book also problematises what it considers as teachers’ unions mobilising the quality 
education framework as a way to strengthen teachers’ power and their membership: 
  “Teachers’ organizations have overwhelming incentives to exert political 
pressure in this area. First, smaller class size is popular with members because 
it facilitates their work. Second, it directly contributes to union power because 
it implies the hiring of more teachers and expansion of union numbers” 
(Bruns and Luque, 2014: 296). 
When discussed, industrial action is depicted as a negative act rather than as a 
legitimate political instrument or a labour right. In Bruns and Luque (2014), for 
instance, the “troubling” nature of protests is made explicit and underscored. As a 
word-association technique reveals: actions in the streets are termed as “disruptive”, 
confrontation is explicitly labelled as “bitter”, and strikes are described/qualified as 
“violent”, “painful”, “damaging” and “disruptive”. This critical approach to strikes 
or mobilisations can also be found in the work of Abadzi (2007), who emphasises the 
impact of these practices in terms of time lost for student learning: 
  “Teacher unions and the strikes they proclaim account for various amounts 
of time loss worldwide. The conflicts between governments and the teachers’ 
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unions may affect student performance. In Mexico it was found that union 
power is associated with test outcomes; (…) medium power was found to be 
significant and had a relatively large negative effect. In Argentina, adversarial 
political alignments were associated with a decrease in effective numbers 
of class days, with an indirect negative effect on student performance in 
Argentina” (Abadzi, 2007: 12). 
Bruns and Luque (2014) offer some policy guidance to deal with unions, encouraging 
governments to confront sensible issues (likely to be resisted by teachers) in a direct 
way, but advising them against the confrontation this may generate. Some of these 
“tips” include the launching of reforms at the start of an administration, their sequential 
or progressive implementation, or the construction of strategic alliances, a strategy 
already recommended by Bruns et al. (2011).
  “Uniting two sides of the stakeholder triangle (civil society and government) 
against the third (organized teachers) can create political space for the 
adoption of reforms, including the three that most directly threaten 
the interests of teachers as an organized group: individual performance 
evaluation, differentiated pay, and loss of job stability” (Bruns and Luque, 
2014: 324). 
  “It is important to recognize up-front that accountability-oriented reforms 
implemented at any scale will likely face challenges, from both teachers’ 
unions and education bureaucracies. Working as much as possible to create 
coalitions for reform—and using information and communications channels 
to drive home the goals and benefits of the reforms—is critical” (Bruns et al., 
2011: 246).
The authors are also well aware that unions’ fragmentation (geographic or by 
education level) favours the implementation of reforms. Consistently, they provide 
recommendations on how to “divide” the profession. Among other things, they 
recommend inviting teachers to renounce tenure or related benefits in exchange for 
the application of merit-based pay policies that may imply salary increases. 
  “Governments appear to perceive that the fragmentation of interests 
that threatens union power can also mean potential allies for proposed 
reforms within the teaching force. This split has been clearly visible 
in career path reforms in the U.S. context (…) Similar dynamics are 
beginning to be observed in Latin American cases” (Ibid., 2011: 294).
Nonetheless, other World Bank publications appear to have a relatively more 
“benevolent” attitude towards teachers’ organisations. Interestingly, four of the five 
publications with such an approach to TUs are focused on the Sub-Saharan Africa 
region, where unions are expected to play a positive role in the development of the 
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education system. Accordingly, in these documents, TUs are not portrayed simply as 
vested interests but as potential allies.9 
  “Teachers’ unions have become important professional and political forces in 
many Sub- Saharan African countries in shaping the conditions of teachers’ 
working lives. They operate largely as trade unions, with the goal of protecting 
interests and promoting cooperation among teachers (Farrell and Oliveira, 
1993). However, in some countries, teachers’ unions have broadened their 
interests and are engaging as partners with governments in educational quality 
improvement initiatives. This is often accomplished through professional 
development activities for union members. In doing so, unions provide a 
mechanism through which teachers can be more effectively represented and 
consulted on the issues, programs, and policies that affect them (Farrell and 
Oliveira, 1993)” (Mulkeen et al., 2007: 31).
Finally, it should be noted that some documents take a rather ambivalent (or simply 
more nuanced) position. This is the case with Incentives to Improve Teaching (Vegas, 
2005), which recalls the “unpredictability” or, at least, variability regarding the effect 
of unions on education quality. In fact, the book presents a rather ambiguous stance 
regarding these organisations and seem to avoid black-and-white positions, although 
in some cases it seems to embrace a rather critical standpoint. This is particularly 
the case for Chapter 11, Political Economy, Incentives and Teachers’ Unions. Case 
Studies in Chile and Peru, authored by L. Crouch. Although the text makes explicit 
that “the intent of the chapter is not so much to provide generalizable lessons or to 
test hypotheses, as to point toward agendas for further analysis”, the chapter ends 
up drawing some generalist – and not particularly positive - conclusions about the 
role that teachers’ unions can play in education politics. 
  “In both the United States and Latin America, unions have themselves 
become monopolistic and bureaucratic. They have typically succeeded 
in increasing salaries (…) But, in so doing, they have used tactics that 
were borrowed from industrial unionism and that have typically not 
led to an improved sense of professionalism or autonomy (…) This very 
deprofessionalization is generating internal pressures within unions, 
because the rank and file have professional and individual aspirations. 
However, the leadership frequently may prefer to work with a unified, 
collectivized mass that is easier to mobilize (in some cases to achieve 
collective goals that the rank and file themselves approve of)” (Crouch, in 
Vegas, 2005: 418-419).
9  On their part, Bundy et al. (2009) are very positive about teachers’ unions in relation to HIV/AIDS 
issues. Unions are regarded as organisations of great value, supporting HIV-affected members, 
combating stigma and offering practical care organising voluntary counselling and testing cam-
paigns and financial aid, protecting teachers in the workplace.
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The chapter, however, combines this approach with other passages emphasising the 
scope and need for cooperation: 
  “One may find it expedient to formally involve unions in developing 
the work rules and broad incentives, and in monitoring, as long as they 
are willing to take formal, professional, accountability for results. This 
inclusion may be expedient to minimize the tendency of unions to 
block implementation after the experiments are designed. It may be 
expedient, also, because ultimately teachers will have good, applied ideas 
about school improvements. Their voiced suggestions may carry more 
implementation weight if they have been collectively vetted” (Crouch, in 
Vegas, 2005: 420).
Ultimately, the chapter seem to avoid antagonistic positions but, at the same time, it 
appears to be more concerned by the potential “risk” posed by unions, and to value 
unions’ participation only when some sort of cooperation and ideological affinity is 
secured. 
2.3. Policy recommendations and advice
2.3.1. Enhancing accountability: a managerialist agenda
A very significant part of the World Bank’s policy guidance addresses the issues 
of teachers’ contribution to education quality. Among the extensive list of policy 
solutions, the use of performance-based incentives clearly stands out and is by far 
the most widely recommended policy: half of the documents suggest some form 
of reward on the basis of results. Nevertheless, a wide variety of possible incentive 














FIGURE 3  -  Knowlegde products discussing teachers’ unions
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  “Taken together, merit pay, certification pay and attendance pay can 
all be considered examples of “performance incentives” for existing 
teachers, whereas hardship pay and scarce-expertise pay are designed 
to recruit teachers for specific locations or fields of teaching. Incentive 
programs can be targeted at individual teachers (teacher incentive 
programs) or an entire school (“whole school” incentive programs); they 
may or may not be competitive” (Lockheed, 2014: 2-3).
Although the nature of incentive frameworks is not always specified, they are 
generally equalled to one-time allowances added to a (previously fixed) salary (i.e. 
financial bonuses). However, more drastic incentive schemes include career path 
reform establishing promotions on the basis of skills and performance (as opposed to 
seniority) and widening salary differentiation between teachers (see Bruns and Luque, 
2014). These types of policies go together with high-stakes testing (i.e. performance 
evaluations with significant effects on teachers in terms of rewards or sanctions). The 
assumption that this type of evaluation is desirable and will have a positive impact 
on students’ learning10  is broadly accepted within the Bank’s publications11. In line 
with the World Bank ethos, part of the interest in performance-based incentives lies 
in their cost-effectiveness potential when compared to “input” measures such as the 
provision of teaching-learning material and/or teacher training: 
  “Teacher-performance pay led to significant improvements in student 
test scores, with no evidence of any adverse consequences of the 
program. Additional school inputs were also effective in raising test 
scores, but the teacher incentive programs were three times as cost 
effective” (Muralidharan and Sundararaman, 2011a: 73).
The Bank’s fascination with performance-based incentives should be read in connection 
with claims about the lack of effect of teachers’ qualifications and experience as 
predictors of teaching quality and, ultimately, as guarantees of student learning. 
Teachers’ education or years of experience are regarded as inappropriate attributes 
or proxies to determine teachers’ remuneration. Instead, paying teachers on the basis 
of “proved” performance is considered to be much more appropriate:
10  In addition to improving student learning, some documents consider performance-based incen-
tives as likely to have an impact on potential teacher candidates, motivating ‘results-driven indi-
viduals’ to enter the profession. 
11  Interestingly, it is also suggested that feedback on students’ learning has an impact on learning 
outcomes only when accompanied by performance-linked bonuses: «While our results do not 
speak to the potential effectiveness of such feedback when combined with teacher training and tar-
geted follow up, it does suggest that diagnostic feedback to teachers by itself may not be enough 
to improve student learning outcomes, especially in the absence of improved incentives to make 
effective use of the additional inputs» (Muralidharan and Sundararaman, 2010: 189).
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  “Researchers agree that many important aspects of teacher quality 
are not captured by the commonly used quality indicators such as 
education, experience, and subject matter knowledge” (Pandey et al., 
2008: 13). 
  “Distinguishing high-quality teachers from low-quality teachers on all 
levels of competency is even more challenging; the huge variability in 
quality among teachers is typically not easily explained by observable 
indicators such as academic qualifications or experience (Rivkin, 
Hanushek, and Kain, 2005)” (Chang et al., 2014: 111). 
  “An increasing body of research shows that teacher characteristics 
rewarded under the status quo in most school systems (such as 
experience and master’s degrees in education) are poor predictors 
of better student outcomes (Gordon, Kane, & Staiger, 2006; Rivkin, 
Hanushek, & Kain 2005; Rockoff, 2004)” (Muralidharan and 
Sundararaman, 2011b: 394). 
  “Almost universally, teacher recruitment and promotion are based on 
the number of years of pre-service training, formal certificates, and years 
in service. Yet an extensive body of research has documented the lack 
of correlation between these “observable” factors and teachers’ actual 
effectiveness in the classroom (…) The clear implication of available 
research is that most school systems are recruiting and rewarding 
teachers for the wrong things, failing to encourage the capacities and 
behaviors that contribute most directly to student learning results, and 
unable to sanction ineffective performance” (Bruns et al., 2011: 142-143).
Although the convenience and potential of performance-based incentives emerges 
as quite a cross-cutting idea, it is worth noting that some of the documents show a 
distinctively “cautious” approach towards these sorts of schemes – or, at least, avoid 
absolute positions and favour a relatively critical perspective. This is particularly the 
case in Incentives to Improve Teaching (edited by Vegas, 2005). This book offers 
a thorough and in-depth review of different experiences of performance-based 
incentives in Latin America, including a chapter devoted to a literature review on the 
issue. Maybe not surprisingly (given the volume of reviewed evidence), the book finds 
mixed results in what determines the effectiveness of these schemes: “the devil is in 
the details” (Vegas, 2005: xiii). The book makes it clear that incentives operate as part 
of a broader system and, most importantly, entail important risks: 
  “Because teachers respond to incentives, education policymakers can 
improve the quality of teaching and learning by designing effective 
incentives that will attract, retain, and motivate highly qualified teachers. 
But how teacher incentives are designed—and implemented—also 
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matters. In various cases, teachers have been found to respond adversely 
to incentives by, for example, reducing collaboration among teachers 
themselves, excluding low-performing students from classes, cheating on 
or manipulating the indicator on which rewards are based, decreasing the 
academic rigor of classes, or “teaching to the test” to the detriment of 
other subjects and skills” (Vegas and Umansky, in Vegas, 2005: 4).
  “(…) Merely looking at changes in the measured output, such as 
improvements in student test scores, may not tell the whole story of the 
effect of incentive reforms. More important, changes in the measured 
output do not necessarily correlate with changes in the desired outcome. 
Rather, observed and measured output changes may mask unintended 
effects, such as damage to assets, reallocation of effort, or manipulation 
of measurement indicators” (Umansky, in Vegas, 2005: 24).
The book, in fact, reviews different “failed” experiments where incentives proved 
unsuccessful, did not deliver their promise, or had unintended and unexpected 
effects (see, for instance, Chapter 6 authored by Urquiola and Vegas; or Chapter 7 by 
McEwan and Santibáñez). And although these findings do not preclude an essentially 
“optimistic” view of this policy option, it offers a distinctively “circumspect” approach.
Holding teachers accountable by parents or communities, and according parents or 
communities’ oversight of teachers is considered a recommendable policy in one-third 
of the documents (34.38 per cent). This policy approach usually goes together with 
stronger forms of school-based management or community participation in schools. 
The idea is to give more responsibilities to local committees or to school councils and, 
among other competences, enable them to fire and hire teachers. This is what Bruns, 
Filmer and Patrinos (2011) call strong forms of school-based management. Among 
other effects, parental control is expected to control teachers’ attendance: 
  “Amongst the surveyed schools, there was a clear trend that schools 
with FMCs [Fathers and Mothers Councils] tend to have less teacher 
absenteeism. Therefore, one of the proposed solutions for reducing teacher 
absenteeism is to have effective FMCs in schools across the country, which 
actively interact with teachers and school staff and monitor their activities” 
(WB, 2006: 52).
Again, it is important to bear in mind that some documents adopt a more “vigilant” 
approach to the question. The book, Incentives to Improve Teaching (2005) discusses 
three experiences with school-based management schemes conducted in El Salvador, 
Honduras, and Nicaragua, highlighting the possibility of unexpected effects and 
limited impacts in areas such as student achievement, classroom processes, or teacher 
motivation. As the following excerpt captures:
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  “We need to consider another scenario where community school 
parents limit their oversight to the most visible aspects of teacher 
effort—teachers’ attendance and hours worked—without entering 
classrooms and instigating changes in teaching methodology and 
classroom management. In other words, community parent councils 
may not be striving to create the best schools; they may simply want the 
most efficient schools” (Di Gropello and Marshall, in Vegas, 2005: 355).
Similar to this form of management, a significant number of documents (25 per cent) recommend 
the introduction of contract teachers into the system. For instance, Bruns et al. (2011) note that 
“the evidence supports a theory of action in which the positive impacts of contract teacher 
reforms hinge on the de facto effectiveness of local monitoring”. Contract teachers (also known 
in some contexts as para-teachers) are teachers contracted on a temporary basis and usually with 
lower qualifications and/or training than regular teachers, whether by education authorities or by 
local communities. Several World Bank documents consider contract teachers as a policy option 
to be adopted in exceptional situations. For instance, in some documents, contract teachers are 
seen as a way to remedy teacher supply difficulties in remote areas:
  “Recruiting local people as teachers may help to address the 
deployment problem. In Lesotho, where the selection of teachers is 
done by school management, schools are able to employ local people 
who are more likely to accept the post and remain in it. This results in 
recruitment of less-qualified teachers in rural schools but provides a 
stable cohort of teachers even in the most remote schools” (Mulkeen 
and Chen, 2008: 6).
Other documents, however, consider the use of contract teachers in a more systematic way 
and as an alternative to the regular teaching force (which, in many countries, enjoys civil servant 
status). In these cases, contract teachers are seen as a means to enhance teacher effort and 
accountability, as well as boost the cost-effectiveness of the system.
  “The results from the paper show that in government schools, contract 
teachers are associated with higher effort compared to regular teachers; 
and higher teacher effort is associated with better student performance 
after controlling for other school, teacher and student characteristics 
(…) Contract teachers now form a sizable part of the teaching force in 
public elementary education in India. The evidence so far suggests that 
at least in the short run, contract teachers are a more efficient resource 
compared to regular teachers (…) By hiring contract teachers in lieu of 
regular teachers, the government buys the same or more learning output 
at a lower cost (…) teacher effort may work better than other input based 
policies in raising education quality” (Goyal and Pandey 2011: 11-12).
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The lower levels of teacher qualifications and preparation of contract teachers are generally 
regarded as a lesser evil. Not coincidentally, the use of contract teachers frequently coincides 
with the provision of alternative entry paths to the teaching profession, which is recommended 
in 15.63 per cent of the analysed documents. These documents advocate for teacher training 
systems involving minimal pre-service preparation, usually in combination with additional in-
service training and potentially allowing the employment of untrained teachers (or teachers 
holding credentials below the ordinarily required level) (see Box 2). 
BOX 2.  THE CASE FOR ALTERNATIVE PATHWAYS: TEACH FOR 
AMERICA AS A MODEL?
Many of the World Bank’s documents seem predisposed to considering 
“alternative pathways” regarding entrance into the teaching profession. 
However, on the basis of the reviewed knowledge products, it remains unclear 
which teachers are expected to be attracted by the increasing flexibility of entry 
requirements. Apparently, and considering the “inspiring role” of the Teach 
For America model, it is assumed that more flexible requirements should allow 
for the entrance of professionals from other fields (e.g. individuals having 
higher education qualifications in other areas) through highly selective routes:
“A number of education systems around the world have opened their 
recruitment processes to individuals not formally trained as teachers. In 
some countries, this policy has grown out of concerns over the low academic 
quality of teacher education programs and a belief that individuals with 
higher education degrees in specific content areas may have stronger 
expertise than graduates from teacher education programs. A second 
motivation is the difficulty in finding enough conventionally trained teachers 
to meet specific skills needs, particularly for secondary education, math, 
and sciences. A third motivation is a shortage of conventionally trained 
teachers willing to teach in challenging environments, such as disadvantaged 
urban schools or in remote rural areas” (Bruns and Luque, 2014: 164).
“The Teach For America model of alternative recruitment has been 
spreading in Latin America since 2007, under the umbrella name of 
Teach For All (TFA). Programs launched in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Mexico, and Peru have demonstrated a “proof of concept”: 
talented young graduates from top universities who were not otherwise 
considering a teaching career have been willing to commit to two years 
teaching in disadvantaged school” (Bruns and Luque, 2014: 293).
“Alternative models, which include those that do not fit into the concurrent or 
consecutive models, seek to attract talented individuals (usually professionals in
28
E D U C A T I O N  I N T E R N A T I O N A L
 other disciplines) into teaching. These models typically entail a shorter period 
of teacher-specific education and training, during which individuals develop 
the qualifications required to become a teacher. In determining the education 
routes available to people who want to become teachers, policy makers face 
a trade-off between providing flexibility for the most talented individuals 
to enter the teaching profession, while at the same time ensuring minimal 
inequality in the qualifications held by teachers” (SABER-Teachers: 14).
However, in some cases, it is difficult to discern whether these flexibilisation 
schemes should enable the recruitment of individuals not holding (higher) 
education credentials. If this was the case, flexibilisation would in turn 
legitimatise the establishment of accelerated teacher training programmes 
or upgrading programmes for under-qualified teachers as those found in a 
substantial part of the World Bank’s lending projects (see next section), which 
is likely to have a destabilising and deprofessionalising impact. Essentially, the 
idea of alternative pathways seems suitable to address two competing theories 
of change, as suggested by Emiliana Vegas in the World Bank education blog.12  
In her post, Vegas says that “the evidence from various programs across the 
world suggests that alternative pathways may help ease teacher shortages 
and bring into the profession individuals who are at least as effective as 
traditionally-trained teachers”. However, a variety of profiles could fall into the 
category of individuals “not trained as traditionally-trained teachers”, including:
- “Teachers who are hired on fixed-term renewable contracts without 
having been professionally trained through the traditional initial teacher 
education programs, and who are paid much lower salaries than regular 
civil service teachers” (with reference to contract teachers programmes)
- “College graduates from all backgrounds (not necessarily education 
graduates) from some of the best colleges and universities in the 
country to teach for two years in urban and rural public schools that 
serve disadvantaged students” (with reference to Teach For America).
Policies facilitating the removal of low-performing teachers are considered in a number of the 
reviewed WB documents (21.88 per cent). They include probation periods for novice teachers, 
performance-conditioned employment, and the formation of a separate teaching service (with a 
status different to civil servants’, i.e. more flexible and not requiring open-ended appointments). 
In addition, to enable the dismissal of underperforming teachers, placing a question mark over 
job stability is considered to have the additional advantage of encouraging teacher effort. 
12   See http://blogs.worldbank.org/education/are-alternative-pathways-into-teaching-bad-for-
students.
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2.3.2.  An (under-developed) professionalisation agenda and other policy 
recommendations
The improvement of teacher training is also a recurrent idea within the policy 
recommendations included in the reviewed literature. About one-third (34.38 per cent) 
of the documents refer to the imperative of upgrading pre-service teacher training and 
promoting and improving professional development in order to update teachers’ skills. 
This includes policies that would seem to promote a modernisation or strengthening of 
teacher training programmes. This fits within a teachers’ professionalisation agenda that 
goes against those policies aimed at the acceleration or flexibilisation of teacher training 
and/or the provision of in-service training for under-qualified teachers. However, it 
should be noted that most of the references lack detail regarding the design of the 
(renewed) training schemes, and the details that are provided vary noticeably.
Nonetheless, other policies that fit within a professionalisation agenda are much less 
frequently recommended. This is the case for the utilisation of more demanding criteria 
in the selection of candidates for teacher education programmes (recommended in 
12.5 per cent of the documents). It also applies to the raising of recruitment standards 
via a certification process that would enable the creation of a pre-qualified teachers’ 
pool or to a (more) selective licencing process (15.63 per cent of the publications). 
Regarding efficiency related issues, the use of hardship bonuses is the most frequently 
recommended solution, mentioned by one out of five documents (18.75 per cent). 
Equally, multi-grade and multi-subject teaching is recommended in 15.63 per cent 
of the documents. 
Finally, it is worth paying attention to policies addressing issues with a significant impact on 
teachers’ labour conditions and welfare. One-fifth of the reviewed documents allude to 
the need for increased and/or punctual remuneration or to the protection of labour rights.
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2.4. What do emblematic publications say?
In this section, we refer to three of the most recent and emblematic publications addressing 
teacher-related issues. They are Making Schools Work, SABER-Teachers, and the 2020 
Education Strategy “Learning for All”. The section tries to capture the main points 
addressed by these documents and the new debate directions they point to.  
2.4.1.  “Creating a culprit”:  Bruns, Filmer and Patrinos (2011) Making Schools Work
The focus on teacher effectiveness is likely to result in the blaming of education workers 
for the low levels of education quality in any given country. This attribution is evident 
to varying degrees in the reviewed literature, but it is particularly explicit in the book, 
Making Schools Work, authored by Bruns, Filmer and Patrinos (2011). The book argues 
that is important to pay closer attention to teachers’ efforts for two main reasons. 
First, students’ learning is considered as a reliable predictor of long-term economic 
growth. Drawing on the work of Hanushek and Woessman (2007, 2010), the authors 
highlight the importance of “what students actually learn” as opposed to average 
years of schooling. Secondly, spending on education is reported to be only weakly 
correlated with student performance. As a consequence, issues in the service delivery 
chain – including what teachers do in the classroom and how - must be considered in 
order to explain the different levels of student learning. 
In essence, it is possible to identify a displacement of attention, on the one hand, 
from education access to learning and, on the other, from the lack of resources to 
service delivery failures in Bruns, Filmer and Patrinos’ book. In fact, the authors 
explicitly focus on “the threats to education quality that cannot be explained by lack of 
resources” (p. 1). Nonetheless, this new locus of attention does not simply complement 
an inputs-based approach, but seems to attempt to substitute it. Although the first 
chapter admits that “these are not the only problems facing education systems in the 
developing world” and that “inadequate funding may be the biggest challenge that 
developing countries face”, the book focuses on exploring service delivery failures of 
an endogenous nature, and on recommending accountability reforms as the solution. 
This association is misleading, and contributes to a disregard for the importance and 
impact of other factors besides school-based determinants such as those of a socio-
economic or regulatory nature.  
It is also noteworthy that, in a rather reductionist move, student learning is equalled 
to average cognitive skills and to students’ performance in international or national 
standardised tests. Similarly, learning (as opposed to education attainment) is also 
equalled to school quality (as opposed to school “quantity”, e.g., years spent at 
schools, access and completion). 
The authors turns the spotlight on teachers with statements such as “the most 
widespread losses and abuses in education systems occur on the front lines – teachers 
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who are absent from their posts or who demand illegal payments for services that 
are legally free” (p.7). The book draws attention to teacher absenteeism and the loss 
of instructional time, but also to the highly variable levels of teachers’ ability as the 
main causes of deficits in students’ learning. It also makes reference to “egregious 
performance failures” on the part of teachers and attributes such failures to a disconnect 
between the incentives teachers face and their performance. Here, the authors of 
Making Schools Work problematise fixed salary schedules, lifetime tenures, and flat 
labour hierarchies, as well as a system of recruitment and promotion based on the 
number of years of pre-service training, formal certificates, and years in service. On the 
basis of these considerations, the authors review the available evidence and advocate 
for pay-for-performance programmes and contracts without guaranteed tenure. It is 
considered that these policies establish an adequate link between rewards and desired 
outcomes and are likely to incentivise teacher effort, which, the report argues, is far 
from being taken for granted.
These assertions are, to some extent, present in the majority of the Bank’s knowledge 
products, but this publication is particularly noteworthy because of its emphasis on 
accountability failures at the teachers’ level. Fundamentally, and through a reasoning 
that ultimately downplays the importance of access, funding, or external factors 
affecting students’ learning, the authors makes teachers largely responsible for 
the limitations faced by education systems in developing countries. Moreover, the 
reductionist conception of teachers’ motivation that informs the document is also 
significant. Although the authors note that “the assumption that agents work only 
for extrinsic (financial) rewards has come under scrutiny in both the psychology and 
economics literature in recent years”, the rationale for the recommended policies owes 
much to a materialistic version of the principal-agent theory (see p. 38):
  “Principal-agent’ (or employer-employee) relationships are a central topic 
of economics and industrial relations research because while employers 
(principals) need employees (agents) to help achieve organizational 
objectives, the two parties have divergent interests. Employees want to 
maximize compensation and minimize effort, and employers want the 
opposite. (…) if the contract is structured so that agents are paid a flat rate 
irrespective of their level of effort or ability, or if job tenure is guaranteed 
irrespective of performance, it is unlikely that employees will exert 
additional effort or focus on doing the things that matter to the principal ” 
(Bruns et al., 2014: 181). 
2.4.2.  SABER-Teachers (2012)
Teacher policies was the first policy domain addressed by the Systems Approach for 
Better Education Results (SABER), a World Bank multi-year programme envisaged 
for the development of a system approach to educational change. SABER develops 
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a conceptual and analytical framework and measurement tools for different policy 
domains of an education system to facilitate countries undertaking self-diagnosis 
and adopting the most effective policies. The all-embracing nature of the project, 
conceptualised as a databank and ‘lender’ of best practices, marks SABER as a 
milestone in the Bank’s longstanding effort to become a knowledge bank able to 
define and guide worldwide education reforms (cf. Steiner-Khamsi in Gogolin et al., 
2007). The SABER programme is the most genuine product of such an ambition (cf. 
Siqueira, 2012).13 
SABER-Teachers is organised in a twofold structure, composed of a policy mapping 
section (devoted to a sort of “conceptual clarification”) and a policy guidance section 
(which identifies goals, levers and advice on policy “prioritisation”). The document 
considers teacher effectiveness as a key predictor of student learning and argues for 
improved and adequate teacher policies. However, it is difficult to identify a clear-cut 
orientation in SABER-Teachers: the first component considers a number of possible 
approaches on teacher regulation, usually taking into account “both sides of the 
coin” and setting out the pros and cons of different policies. Similarly, no strong 
recommendations can be found in the section devoted to prioritisation, since it does 
not take a definite stance. Hence, the document describes a “professional autonomy” 
model, a “shared responsibility” model, a “career development” model, and a 
“performance management” model (exemplified by Finland, Shanghai, Ontario, and 
Singapore respectively) but does not declare an explicit preference for any of the four 
models14. Moreover, the “levers” to reach the identified goals consist of questions, 
which makes it difficult to discern which is the recommended option. 
Overall, SABER-Teachers appears less prescriptive than most World Bank products, 
and even less than other SABER policy domains. Nonetheless, a look at the considered 
themes and selected goals may shed some light on SABER-Teachers’ orientation. Out of 
the 10 policy areas reviewed in the framework, seven can be grouped in a managerial 
or management dimension (i.e. requirements to enter and remain in the profession, 
recruitment and employment, workload and autonomy, compensation, retirement, 
13   However, there are grounds to doubt the effective continuation of the SABER-Teachers - no 
country reports were produced during 2014, what suggests a somewhat stagnant phase.
 
14   Interestingly, these four teacher policy profiles (i.e. combination of teacher policies in top sys-
tems) seem to be somewhat underused as an analytical and policy orienting tool. In fact, the 
SABER-Teachers Background Paper specifically dealing with the issue (What Are the Different 
Profiles of Successful Teacher Policy Systems?, authored by A.J. Ganimian and E. Vegas) cannot 
currently be found through the search engine in the WB open knowledge repository, but can 
only be accessed in draft form (dating from 2011) elsewhere in the web. [Retrieved from: http://
wbgfiles.worldbank.org/documents/hdn/ed/saber/supporting_doc/Background/TCH/What_Are_
the_Different_Profiles_of.pdf].
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monitoring of teaching quality, and school leadership). Following Ginsburg’s (2012) 
categorisation, teachers are mainly regarded as human resources, employees, or staff 
members who need to be effectively managed, while only two other SABER areas 
regard teachers as training recipients (initial teacher preparation and professional 
development) and one as members of professional organisations (teacher representation 
and voice). Similarly, out of eight core teacher policy goals, only two focus on teacher 
development as professionals (preparing teachers with relevant training and experience 
and supporting teachers to improve instruction), while the remaining goals deal 
with human resource management issues (setting clear expectations for teachers, 
attracting the best candidates into teaching, matching teachers’ skills with students’ 
needs, leading teachers with strong principals, monitoring teaching and learning, and 
motivating teachers to perform).
Of particular interest are those gaps or aspects around which SABER adopts a cautious 
approach that prevents it from making strong recommendations given insufficient or 
conflicting evidence. This is the case for a broad range of themes such as subject matter 
knowledge vs. pedagogy training, teacher training formats, school principals’ autonomy 
regarding teachers’ employment and pay, community and parental involvement in the 
monitoring of teacher performance, and public school rankings as a means to motivate 
teacher performance. 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that SABER-Teachers also refers to teachers’ organisations 
although these actors do not play a central role in the SABER framework. The lack 
of evidence on the relationship between unionisation and education quality leads 
SABER-Teachers to exclude teacher organisations from the eight policy goals promoted 
in the document. As a consequence, the document does not take a clear or explicit 
stance on the expected contribution or role of teacher organisations. In that sense, 
the SABER-Teachers’ collection of related country cases is far more informative. Here, 
teacher organisations appear as a source of concern in two of them (due to the loss of 
school days as a consequence of strike action). Moreover, the absence of the right to 
collective bargaining or freedom of association does not appear as a major concern in 
the SABER documents. In fact, such circumstances only gives rise to succinct comments 
in a rather dispassionate style: 
  “Jordanian teachers are not represented by teacher organizations. 
Teachers’ right to associate was prohibited in 1994 by the Supreme 
Council. Both strike action and collective bargaining are illegal. However, 
general strike action (not limited to teacher organizations) does take 
place, and some teacher organizations are focused on gaining official 
sanction from the Ministry for their activities and demanding mandatory 
affiliation of teachers. Generally, teacher representatives appointed by the 
Ministry of Education act as interlocutors on behalf of teachers and may 
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express views on certain policy areas, including initial teacher education, 
professional development, recruitment, performance evaluations, 
curricula, and student assessment procedures” (SABER Jordan, 2010).
  “There are 2 teacher organizations – one for primary school teachers 
and the other for secondary. After teacher strikes took place as teachers 
demanded increased pay in the mid-1990s, these organizations have 
played a minimal role and collective bargaining is prohibited” (SABER 
Djibouti, 2010).
The problems and solutions emphasised in SABER-Teachers Country Reports appear to 
have little in common with the issues considered by the rest of the Bank’s knowledge 
products. Hence, absence rates and references to the lack of effort receive only limited 
or no attention, while the emphasis on preparation-related issues is quite noticeable. 
Poor teacher education, for instance, is cited by nearly 70 per cent of the country case 
documents, and the presence of untrained teachers and the attraction of insufficiently 
prepared candidates are mentioned by half of the country reports, in contrast with the more 
limited attention devoted to these issues by the rest of the Bank’s knowledge products.
Instead of informing policy makers about the main challenges with regard to 
teachers, SABER-Teachers problematises the absence of adequate policies to deal 
with (unspecified) teacher-related issues. Apparently, the objective of SABER is not so 
much to identify the existence of factual problems but the absence of solutions. In a 
way, the prior definition of a set of policy solutions gives rise to the emergence of new 
problems – namely, the absence of these policy solutions. The problem seems to be 
the non-existence of a solution (in a sort of catch-22 situation, or circular/tautological 
argument).
Similarly, the SABER-Teachers Country Reports follow a particular style. In these reports, 
there are no data, figures, or research references about teachers’ deficient contribution 
to the quality of education systems, inefficient deployment, or (problematic) levels of 
instruction. Instead, the reports emphasise the absence of policy guidelines, systems, 
or mechanisms necessary to deal with these issues in the countries under review. A 
pervasive pattern in the reports is: “There are no policies in place to reward teacher 
performance with higher compensation or promotion, which may discourage highly 
motivated candidates from becoming teachers” (SABER Paraguay, 2012: 1); “There 
are untapped incentives to get teachers to work in hard-to-staff areas and to teach 
critical shortage subjects” (SABER Yemen, 2010: 6); “Minimum mechanisms are in 
place to hold teachers accountable” (SABER Egypt, 2010: 12), and so on.
Consistent with this perspective, up to 75 per cent of the country reports address poor 
administrative and institutional management, poor levels of in-school supervision, and 
inappropriate time allocations (i.e. unspecific or inappropriate distribution of teachers’ 
working time). And 85.7 per cent of the documents suggest the need for increased 
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and upgraded regulation on the part of concerned authorities, through a variety of 
forms, and particularly through data management systems. 
In essence, SABER-Teachers and the related country reports seem to advocate for 
the construction of a minimal institutional structure, in contexts where the levels of 
administrative development are noticeably low. This approach, which needs to be 
contextualised within the Bank’s willingness to become a knowledge bank, contributes 
to explaining the (apparently) tautological nature of the project – SABER is not exactly 
interested in actual teacher-related issues in particular contexts, but is expected to work 
as a clearing house of policy guidance.
As stated above, SABER-Teachers identifies four teacher policy profiles and four 
emblematic education systems, namely, a “professional autonomy” model (Finland), 
a “shared responsibility” model (Shanghai), a “career development” model (Ontario) 
and a “performance management” model (Singapore). The first one is considered to be 
the “less government-intensive” model, although education authorities are considered 
to play a key role in ensuring the quality of training. The shared responsibility model 
also grants considerable discretion to teachers, but emphasises the need for mechanisms 
fostering collaboration between educators. The career development model, in turn, is 
focused on building teachers’ capacity. Finally, the performance management model 
is characterised by the tight control of teachers’ work in the classroom and includes 
detailed guidelines, an emphasis on incentives and accountability mechanisms in order 
to address low effort and performance.
 TABLE 1.  REFERENCE COUNTRIES IN SABER-TEACHERS
  Number of comparison charts 
  considering the country % (n= 99)
 JAPAN 72 72,7%
 SOUTH KOREA 67 67,7%
 SINGAPORE 46 46,5%
 CHILE 46 46,5%
 SHANGHAI 38 38,4%
 NETHERLANDS 31 31,3%
 NEW ZEALAND 26 26,3%
 FINLAND 12 12,1%
 ONTARIO 0   0,0%
In principle, all of these models are likely to offer a “roadmap towards improvement” 
and the selection of one profile (as a model for policy reform) should be made on 
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the basis of a compatibility assessment. However, a review of the “comparison 
charts” contained in the SABER country reports (i.e. figures comparing a given 
country with other systems, on the grounds of their exemplarity and/or similarity) 
suggests a certain preference for particular models. The most frequently referenced 
countries can be observed in Table 1 (above). Hence, it is evident that, among the four 
emblematic models, the most government-intensive profile (Singapore, representing 
the performance management model) is the most frequently considered. South Korea 
(considered a top-performing and rapidly improving education system), Japan (a top-
performing system) and Chile (considered a rapidly improving system) also receive a 
great deal of attention. Conversely, those models with an emphasis on pre-service or 
in-service training (Finland and Ontario) are less frequently present.
2.4.3. The World Bank Education Strategy 2020
The World Bank Education Strategy 2020 (ES2020) is conceived as an all-embracing 
policy document with the purpose of influencing relevant decision-makers at a variety 
of levels, including borrowing countries in the Global South (middle and lower-income 
countries), member governments, and international organisations other than the Bank. 
The ES2020’s first priority is the strengthening of education systems through an 
alignment of their governance, management, financing, and performance incentive 
mechanisms, and resting on the principle of accountability. The second priority 
(“Building a High-Quality Knowledge Base to Underpin Education Reforms”), in turn, 
reflects the Bank’s willingness to become a knowledge bank and guide education 
reforms accordingly. 
The Strategy affirms that teacher policies are a priority, but considers that a systemic 
perspective is needed to design adequate and context-sensitive policy guidance. Hence, 
specific policy recommendations are left to the SABER, noting that SABER-Teachers 
has been launched as a prototype (see above). As a result, the document is particularly 
vague, specifically in relation to teachers. Beyond general comments on the need 
to ensure learning and a quality education for all “beyond access”, and a lack of 
incentives and accountability mechanisms, little detail is provided on the policies that 
are more likely to reach these goals. Moreover, and as noted by Ginsburg (2012), 
in contrast to the 1995 and 1999 strategies, the ES2020 does not include a section 
specifically addressing teachers. Similarly, teachers’ unions are conspicuous by their 
absence (without any single mention). More importantly, when referred to, teachers 
are regarded as human resources or employees, while their role as learners or agents 
of change is disregarded (Ginsburg, 2012). 
Similar to Bruns et al. (2011) (see above), the Education Strategy 2020 strategy pays 
limited attention to insufficiencies in the teaching force or to the unequal distribution 
of teachers, and in contrast focuses on accountability measures as the main quality 
criterion: 
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   “The centerpiece of the new education strategy is learning for all. This 
goal is to be attained not only through more investments in inputs (e.g., 
more trained teachers or university professors, a better curriculum, more 
learning materials), but also through support for institutional changes in 
the education system. The new strategy emphasizes the importance of 
aligning governance arrangements, financing, incentives, accountability 
mechanisms, and management tools with national educational goals” 
(World Bank, 2011: 46).
Consequently, the training/recruitment and adequate provision of teachers is far 
from a priority within the Strategy. It is also noteworthy that pedagogy and teachers’ 
training are only mentioned in relation to a changing technological landscape: “These 
technological changes can improve the quality of service delivery, but research and 
field experience indicate that the new technology must be accompanied by profound 
changes in pedagogical methods. The ability of education systems to develop “new 
economy skills” can help countries become more competitive (see Box 2). This implies 
changing the way educators are trained, increasing the supply of qualified educators, 
and improving the relevance of education curricula” (ES2020: 22). According to the 
reviewed document, appropriate pedagogy (jointly with sufficient instruction time) 
is critical to develop basic skills, but no details are provided on what an appropriate 
pedagogy entails. Interestingly, in one of the consultations for the elaboration of the 
ES2020, the World Bank’s head of the education division was asked what pedagogies 
were the best to implement, she replied: “…there are better experts outside [the 
Bank] on this area [(i.e. pedagogy)], even UNESCO and the International Institute for 
Education Planning (…) This is not our comparative advantage” (interview quotation 
from Verger et al, 2014: 13).
2.5. Key findings
•  According to the Bank, teachers are key determiners of student learning, but the 
reviewed documents tend to emphasise how limited the contribution of teachers 
is to education quality and learning. Thus, the idea that teachers account for an 
important part of the low levels of learning is a pervasive one. 
•  This poor contribution is frequently portrayed as the result of a deliberate lack of 
effort, as suggested by continuous references to the intentional loss of instruction 
time, inactivity when in the classroom, and high absence rates. Some documents, 
however, dilute the degree of teachers’ responsibility, considering the impact of 
factors beyond teachers’ control such as second jobs, double-shift schemes, or 
illnesses (particularly HIV/AIDS).
•  The preferred explanation for teachers’ (presumed) deliberate under-performance 
is the lack of accountability structures, and, especially, the absence of performance-
based incentives – uniform and equal labour conditions are perceived as harmful 
and demotivating. 
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•  To a lesser extent, the inadequacy of teacher training (pre-service or professional 
development) and the presence of untrained teachers in the profession are also 
considered to be significant factors explaining poor levels of teacher performance. 
•  When discussing teachers’ unions, the World Bank’s literature tends to focus on 
their role as “obstacles” to necessary reform – while their positive contribution is 
addressed much less frequently. Policy advice on the issue focuses mainly on the 
deactivation or co-optation of teachers’ unions in order to overcome their resistance 
or achieve their cooperation. In contrast, the possibility of a negotiation scheme on 
equal terms is not contemplated.
•  Performance-based incentives emerge as a privileged policy option – being portrayed 
positively in nearly half of the publications. The support enjoyed by school-based 
management schemes and the use of contract teaches suggest also a preference 
for labour instability as a means of motivating teacher effort. 
•  Although less frequently discussed, comments on the importance of teacher 
training and the raising of hiring standards suggests also some consideration for a 
professionalisation agenda focused on the strengthening of teachers skills.
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3.  TEACHERS IN THE WORLD BANK’S LENDING 
PROJECTS
This section focuses on the main teacher-related problems addressed by the World 
Bank’s lending projects, as well as on the policy solutions most frequently supported 
by these projects. Section 3.1 deals with the main teacher-related “issues” identified 
in the projects, and to what extent these issues represent significant obstacles to the 
improvement of education systems. Section 3.2 reviews the roles most frequently 
attributed to or expected from teachers’ unions according to these projects. Finally, 
Section 3.3 discusses the programmes and lines of action most frequently funded 
through the reviewed lending activity. 
3.1. Teacher-related issues to be addressed
3.1.1. Critical points: training, time, and distribution
When it comes to a general diagnosis of the education system, limitations concerning 
teacher education is the most frequently cited challenge in those World Bank lending 
projects with teacher components in them. Up to 52.9 per cent of the projects refer to 
some sort of shortcoming or deficit in teacher training, in particular its limited provision 
and/or low standards. Although a significant proportion of the documents contain 
only general remarks on this issue, other projects elaborate on it, including Project 
08629415  in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which reports that:
  “Existing teachers’ pre-service and in-service training methods and 
quality do not confer sufficient professional expertise. The pre-service 
training of primary school teachers is mostly provided by the 4000 
secondary schools which have a 3-year pedagogical stream (humanités 
pédagogiques) of theoretical training that follows an initial 3-year 
common program for all secondary school students. The quality of the 
humanités pédagogiques is widely seen as mediocre. On-the-job training 
and skill upgrading opportunities are scarce, irregular and depend mostly 
on donor-funded projects”. 
Similarly, Project 094042 in Uzbekistan remarks that:
  “In recent years a number of positive changes have been taking place in 
the area of teachers’ professional development through the work of non-
governmental organizations and the support of donors and international 
lending institutions. But these changes have not permeated through the 
system due in part to lack of local capacity, but also due to approaches to 
15   If not stated otherwise, the projects referred and quoted in this section correspond to the apprai-
sal documents of the lending projects listed in Appendix 3. 
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  staff development that rely on providing training to teachers working 
individually with little or no contact with other teachers in their own 
schools. Many MPE [Ministry of Public Education] sanctioned teachers’ 
skills improvement programs are focused on novelties in content rather 
than methods. Teachers are invited to seminars on an individual basis, 
and incentives to schools for training teachers’ teams do not exist. After 
attending professional development events teachers go back to their 
schools to work on an individual basis, concentrating on the issues related 
to their specific subjects”. 
More generally, seven broad groups of issues can be identified with regard to teacher 
training in World Bank lending projects:
 1.  Inadequate content of pre-service teacher training: teacher education is not providing 
teachers with the adequate pedagogical or professional expertise as a consequence 
of an inappropriate curriculum or learning methods. Additional issues that negatively 
impact the potential of teacher education include: excessively theoretical studies, 
a lack of attention to modern pedagogical approaches, the non-use of innovative 
methodologies, a lack of exposure to key contents or specific needs (ICT, textbooks, 
mother-tongue instruction) and the lack of adaptation to curricular reforms or a 
focus on detailed subject-knowledge rather than pedagogical skills.
 2.  Low qualification levels: pre-service teacher training offered through secondary 
education or short duration of pre-service training. 
 3.  Absence of an (effective) in-service teacher training system: there are claims the 
opportunities for professional development are scarce due to the limited capacity of 
training institutions or the absence of a national system in place. In addition, there 
is a disconnect between in-service and pre-service training, inadequate content 
(modules disconnected from classroom realities or not based on identified needs), or 
inappropriate forms of delivery (during school time, in locations requiring travelling). 
 4.  Poorly equipped institutions, shortages of teaching material, facilities in poor 
conditions. 
 5.  Excessively autonomous pre-service and in-service teacher training institutions, 
weak linkages with educational authorities. 
 6. Teacher training excessively reliant on governmental provision.
 7. Absence of incentives for professional development. 
It is worth noting that teachers’ training-related issues appear to enjoy a variable 
degree of attention in different regions. While around 70 per cent of projects in the 
Middle East, North Africa, Europe, and Central Asia refer to the limitations of teachers’ 
education, this issue is far less considered in other regions (44.4 per cent of the East 
Asia Pacific projects, around 50 per cent in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, and 
36.7 per cent in Latin America and the Caribbean). Significantly, in some of these latter 
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regions, there are concerns about the lack of training of practicing teachers, i.e. by the 
presence of unqualified teachers in the profession. Such a problem is referred in 44.4 
per cent of the East Asia Pacific projects, 37 per cent of Sub-Saharan Africa projects, 
and 36 per cent of South Asia projects. Conversely, only 10 per cent of the projects in 
Europe and Central Asia mention it. 
Beyond training, the level of teachers’ “subject mastery” is rarely a matter of concern 
(being mentioned only by 8.4 per cent of the projects reviewed). However, the utilisation 
of outdated or inadequate pedagogical practices is referred to in one-quarter of the 
projects. Again, the attention devoted to this issue is far from uniform across regions: 
while more than 40  per cent of the European, Central Asia and East Asia Pacific 
projects mention the problem, the figure is halved for Sub-Saharan Africa, South 
Asia, Middle East, and North Africa projects. This variable distribution, in combination 
with the unequal attention directed to training and teacher provision issues described 
below, indicates a noticeable difference in the locus of attention between those regions 
with a higher presence of middle-income countries (such as Latin America, Europe, 
and Central Asia) and those with a greater presence of low-income countries. Such a 
pattern suggests that “what happens in the classroom” (i.e. the pedagogic process) is 
only approached in World Bank projects once more basic problems such as access or 
teacher provision are secured, or that the possible existence of this sort of challenge is 
not considered by the WB in some contexts. 
In addition, the comments made on the use of inadequate pedagogical practices may 
indicate the World Bank’s preferences on pedagogic matters. The projects take a critical 
stance on the use of passive, frontal or teacher-centred methods (referred to as “chalk 
and talk”), as well as on mechanical instruction focused on memorisation and rote 
learning and on the limited attention to pupil interaction. The documents regret the 
lack of student-centred methods and the fostering of critical thinking, questioning, or 
problem-solving approaches. Four of the projects analysed specify these pedagogical 
limitations documenting an (excessively) test-oriented approach – somewhat  surprising 
given the WB’s customary promotion of standardised testing. In Mongolia, for instance, 
it is reported that:
  “The current education culture is test-driven, with assessments not 
promoting improvements in teaching practice. The traditional system of 
education emphasizes rote learning and the ability of learners to follow 
instructions. National tests reinforced this focus (…) Schools are driven by 
an assessment culture, since student test results influence teacher salary 
levels” (Project 096328).
Similarly, in relation to Tanzania, Project 114866 reports how: 
  “Anecdotal evidence suggests that teachers are teaching to the test, rote 
memorization is common, and a large number of students who graduate 
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possess inadequate skills for entry into tertiary institutions or the labor 
market” (Project 114866). 
 
In Pakistan, Project 090346 reports that “pedagogic methods rely on rote learning 
and high stakes examination”, and P101243 reports that “Teaching practices remain 
out-dated and are largely based on a culture of rote learning gearing students towards 
examination”.
Issues related to teachers’ deployment and territorial allocation receive significant 
attention in the World Bank’s lending portfolio; they are referenced to by 44.5 per 
cent of the projects and appear to be a cross-cutting issue. These documents point to 
teachers’ shortages in disadvantaged areas (remote or rural locations, urban slums) or 
the concentration of less-qualified teachers in disadvantaged areas, usually highlighting 
the effects of such a distribution in terms of equity. Closely related, 21 per cent of the 
documents refer to teacher shortages, i.e. generalised high teacher-pupil ratios. In 
fact, in some cases, relative shortages in rural or poor areas (simultaneous to surpluses 
in better-off areas) are difficult to discern from absolute shortages. Combining both 
categories (jointly with the lack of specialists or critical subject shortages), 53.8 per cent 
of the projects refer to significant teacher shortages in a given area, whether resulting 
from inadequate deployment policies or from an insufficient teaching force. Similarly, 
the low rate of female teachers also receives some attention, being mentioned by 10.9 
per cent of the projects16. Importantly, provision and allocation problems are mainly 
highlighted in Sub-Saharan Africa and East-Asia Pacific, where twice as many projects 
(nearly 90 per cent) address these issues as those in the Middle East and North Africa, 
Latin America, Europe and Central Asia. 
Thirdly, the harmful effects of limited instruction time (attributed to teacher absences, 
premature school closures, short school days) receive significant attention, as well as 
teacher absences specifically, which are mentioned by 41.2 per cent and 33.6 per cent 
of the projects respectively. Interestingly, and in contrast to a significant number of 
knowledge products, these limitations are generally dissociated from teachers’ decisions: 
32 out of 49 of those projects mentioning low instruction time (equivalent to 65.3 per 
cent) consider this problem to be (partially) explained by the impact of multiple-shift 
schemes, official stipulations on the length of schooldays, or the remote location of 
certain schools. Or they portray teacher absences as unintentional (a consequence 
of the school location, the impact of illnesses, or other duties such as monitoring 
elections). In fact, only a limited number of projects (a total of eight or 6.72 per cent) 
16  However, this appears to be a problem confined to certain areas – namely, the Middle East and 
North Africa (referred to by one-third of the projects), followed by South Asia (19.2 per cent) and 
Sub-Saharan Africa (12.9 per cent). Moreover, and unlike limitations concerning the supply and 
distribution of available teachers, such an issue results from particular sociocultural dispositions 
rather than from economic constraints.
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contain explicit comments that fall within a narrative of “lack of effort” or “neglect 
of responsibilities” (linking the loss of instructional time or the limited time-on-task to 
deliberate and unjustified decisions by teachers - premature school closures, inefficient 
use of time, poor lesson preparation). It is also worth noting that references to teacher 
absences are far from being equally distributed among geographical areas. Hence, 
no single reference to teacher absences can be found in Europe and Central Asia 
projects, and Latin American projects address it only marginally (in 13.3 per cent 
of the projects). Meanwhile, teachers’ non-attendance (deliberate or justified) as a 
relevant problem is mentioned by 68 per cent of South Asian projects and 55.6 per 
cent of Sub-Saharan African projects.  
The limitations resulting from a weak or poorly developed institutional infrastructure 
(when it comes to managing and monitoring the teaching force) also enjoy noticeable 
and widespread attention in World Bank projects. Nearly one-third of the projects 
make some references to the lack of effectiveness of education authorities, mentioning 
the poor levels of institutional development, the absence of appropriate monitoring, 
evaluation or management mechanisms, the lack of information and detailed data on 
teachers’ performance or attendance, limitations concerning the inspectorate system 
or general comments on the poor levels of accountability, etc. In contrast with the 
evidence in the WB’s knowledge products, references to the harmful effects of job 
stability are very rare. 
3.1.2. The role of accountability
The deficiencies of specific accountability mechanisms are contemplated less often. 
Hence, the absence of performance-based incentives (salary, promotions) is addressed 
by a limited number of projects (14.3 per cent). Usually, these projects note a lack of 
incentives rewarding performance or effectiveness, which is considered to demotivate 
teachers. For Kyrgyz Republic, for instance, P078976 notes that “The salary structure 
of teachers is based largely on seniority. Because salary increases of teachers are 
unrelated to their performance, they provide no incentive for improving their 
effectiveness as teachers - particularly, in terms of what their students are learning”.
Similarly, the following excerpts capture such an approach: 
   “As in most countries, teacher pay in the Philippines depends largely on 
a teacher’s age and qualifications. The absence of performance-related 
pay makes it difficult to reward top teachers. In addition, the national, 
non-differentiated pay scale for teachers makes it difficult to encourage 
teachers into “hard-to-staff’ schools and subject areas and difficult to 
attract and retain top teachers” (Project 094063, The Philippines).
   [Lack of] “professional advancement opportunities and continuous 
performance appraisal and allied reward systems to ensure that teachers 
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use effective classroom practices and continue to enhance their competencies 
throughout their teaching careers” (Project 097104, Indonesia).
  “The public education system is lacking a performance-based incentives 
system and an effective mechanism for evaluating and upgrading the 
performance of the teaching staff” (Project 118187, Lebanon).
Limitations concerning community supervision/accountability are referenced by 10.9 
per cent of the projects17  - reflecting the still limited expansion of these arrangements. 
These projects point to poor levels of empowerment, training and information of 
parents and communities. In Pakistan, for instance, Project 107300 reports that:
  “Large numbers of SMCs [School Managing Committees] either did not 
get off the ground or became dormant over time. Some of the factors that 
contributed to this state-of-affairs included, limited parental participation 
lack of understanding of SMC roles and responsibilities, weak capacity, and 
little or no financial resources”, and in India, Project 118445 notes that 
“Community-based mechanisms are a promising but recent innovation and 
are not yet reliable mechanisms for teacher accountability.”
Related to this, some projects document the effects of corruption (13.4 per cent), 
whether in the form of rent-seeking, nepotism in hiring and deploying practices, 
or bribery. Significantly, this seems to be particularly the case in some settings with 
strong forms of School-Based Management (SBM), which appear to open the door 
to patronage-based recruitment or political interference in the assignment of school 
postings. Projects in Pakistan and Bangladesh account for more than half of the 
references to corruption (9 out of 16).
BOX 3.  BACKFIRING EFFECTS? THE CASE FOR SCHOOL-BASED 
MANAGEMENT IN BANGLADESH
In Bangladesh, SBM appears to be in a particularly advanced stage. Here, 
a growing demand for secondary education has been met through private 
provision and public financial support. In fact, most secondary schools are 
not-for-profit institutions administered by SMCs and receive State subsidies 
(90 per cent of teachers’ salaries, block grants for schools construction and 
maintenance). However, this model of school organisation faces serious issues. 
As reported by the majority of projects in the country, SBM seems to be 
particularly open to political interference and elite capture, leading to malpractice 
in teacher recruitment: 
17  In fact, most of these references are located in South Asian projects – where strong forms of 
SBM have been more clearly advanced (by the WB lending activity) during the last decade. 
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  “School managing committees (SMCs) and Governing Bodies (GBs) were 
supposed to play a critical role in the hiring of teachers and monitoring 
school performance. However, these bodies were sometimes influenced by 
politicians to dole out teaching jobs to unqualified relatives. This political 
interference led to an apparent lack of interest of genuine community 
members and guardians to actively participate in SMCs/GBs” (Project 
102541, Bangladesh).
  “Teachers in private schools were recruited directly by SMCs/GBs. While 
the appointment procedures were clearly laid out in government rules 
and regulations, the hiring system, however, was open to abuse and rent-
seeking. A combination of the lack of application of standardized hiring 
criteria, and inadequate community/parental participation in SMCs/
GBs contributed to frequent violation of hiring practices. Poorer, better-
qualified applicants were overlooked in favor of candidates who could 
contribute to the school’s finances. Pressure was also put on the school to 
appoint relatives of Managing Committee members/chairperson or those in 
powerful positions within the community” (Project 084567, Bangladesh).
  “School Management Communities (with the authority to appoint, 
suspend, dismiss and remove teachers and ensure regular payment 
of teachers’ salaries and to monitor school performance and teacher 
attendance) are often composed predominantly of male elites - e.g. 
members of parliament and politicians routinely chair 20-30 SMCs/GBs 
and often use this position for political aid favour (especially in hiring 
teachers)” (Project 077789, Bangladesh).
Aware of these and other irregularities, some World Bank projects support 
measures such as the establishment of new election rules in SMCs, the setting 
up of merit-based recruitment procedures, and/or the establishment of a non-
governmental agency in charge of accrediting potential teachers. 
  “It is imperative to empower School Management Committees (SMCs) 
or college governing bodies (GBs), as they are the only entities that exist 
at the local level to monitor schools, especially on aspects related to the 
attendance of teachers and students, upkeep of physical infrastructure, and 
performance in examinations. The Regulations on Managing Committees 
of the Registered Non-Government Secondary Schools are being amended 
to ensure that only the deputy commissioners, upazila nirbahi officers, or 
retired government officials nominated by them, can chair SMCs/GBs, and 
that any particular individual (other than deputy commissioners or upazila 
nirbahi officers) cannot chair any more than four committees. All upcoming 
SMCs/GBs elections will follow these rules” (Project 077789, Bangladesh).
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3.1.3. Managing a costly resource
Lending projects also address efficiency issues in relation to teachers. Efficiency and 
cost-saving measures receive considerable attention in one-third of the projects 
reviewed. These projects point to a range of issues considered problematic in terms 
of efficiency including low teacher-student ratios (or oversized networks of schools), 
low teacher workloads, a high proportion of non-teaching staff, and excessively high 
wages. Nonetheless, with regard to this last point, it is worth remarking that, while 
references to the proportion of education budgets allocated to teacher salaries (or 
salary-related expenditures) are contained in almost one-third of the projects (32.5 
per cent), they are only clearly problematised in a small number of documents – a total 
of five or 4.7 per cent:
  “Teacher salaries in Burkina Faso are 7.5 times per capita income 
compared to an estimated 3.5 times per capita income in other developing 
economies. Addressing the high cost of teachers and their inefficient use, 
as well as community involvement in school construction as an alternative, 
is absolutely essential to the ability of the GoBF [Government of Burkina 
Faso] to expand educational opportunities” (Project 098956, Burkina Faso). 
3.1.4. The place for teachers’ welfare
Elements affecting teachers’ welfare, including low salary levels, receive a significant 
degree of attention: 28.6 per cent of the projects make reference to low remuneration, 
delayed or irregular payments, teachers’ income depending on parental contributions, 
or to the lack of job security. In some cases, however, references to low levels of 
remuneration seem to be used to legitimate the introduction of performance-based 
incentives and/or greater salary differentiation. This is the case, for instance, with 
Project 107772 in Armenia or Project 078976 in the Kyrgyz Republic. In the latter, 
moreover, an entire section is devoted to the issue of poor teachers’ labour conditions, 
addressing mainly the issue of low remuneration. However, the section is entitled 
“Lack of teacher incentives” and finishes with a somewhat disconnected stance on 
performance-based salary increases: 
  “A major reason for low learning achievement in rural areas is the 
lack of teacher incentives. Although teacher salaries in urban schools 
are supplemented by sizeable contributions from parents and local 
governments, rural teachers receive only their official salary from the 
state budget. Official teacher salaries - which average US$19 per month 
- are low in both absolute and relative terms (…) The salary structure 
of teachers is based largely on seniority. Because salary increases of 
teachers are unrelated to their performance, they provide no incentive for 
improving their effectiveness as teachers - particularly in terms of what 
their students are learning”.
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3.2. What place for teachers’ unions?
Given the nature of the analysed documents, it is difficult to discern a particular 
attitude towards or conception of teachers’ unions on the basis of the World Bank 
lending activities. Since the projects do not exactly have a diagnostic function, the 
identification of “problems” is imprecise at best. Regarding teachers’ unions, most of 
the projects only address them tangentially, usually documenting their participation in 
consultation processes or including them in the enumeration of relevant stakeholders 
in the education system in question, but without including further details. 
Notwithstanding this, 35 project documents offer more detail on the role played 
(or expected to be played) by the unions. Of these 35, 14 documents contain some 
favourable comments on the role played by teachers’ unions, while 22 contain rather 
negative comments concerning unions –and their territorial distribution is highly 
uneven, as shown in Figure 5. 
Negative comments usually refer to teachers’ unions as a barrier to the successful 
implementation of supported policies in the lending projects, as captured in the 
following excerpts:
  “There may be potential opposition from stakeholders (teachers’ union) in 
relationship to scholarships for both public and private school attendance 
as well as the expansion of EDUCO schools” (Project 078993, El Salvador). 
■ East Asia Pacific 
■ Europe Central Asia
■ Latin America and the Caribbean










FIGURE 5  -  References to teachers’ unions - Lending projects
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  “Some of the policy measures supported by DPL [Development Policy 
Loan] 1 might encounter resistance from powerful interest groups, 
such as the teachers’ unions, wealthy parents, and civil servants. This is 
particularly so for policies to improve the efficiency of resource use and 
educators’ accountability for student learning, delinking teacher salary 
increases from irrelevant and not required qualifications, phasing out 
subsidies to profit-making private schools, and placing all managers on 
time-bound performance contracts” (Project 086875, Namibia). 
Several projects also refer to “unions’ vested interests” and to their “corporativism” as 
the main reason why they try to block reform processes. In Honduras (Project 101218), 
for instance, unions are held responsible for the deficient or soft implementation of 
the incentives programme, and their strikes are considered the “main culprit for the 
shortened school calendar”. Other reports say that:
  “It is important to move towards improving relations between the teachers’ 
union and the education authorities, eliminating perverse linkages between 
the two, and instituting new, results-oriented modes of interaction that are 
more transparent and accountable. In particular, it’s important to redefine 
education supervision, stressing its pedagogic function over administrative 
and union functions” (Project 085851, Mexico). 
  “Corporatist pressures by unions are very strong and particularly difficult 
in the social services sector in which beneficiaries, such as children and 
their parents, often do not count on the same level of organization as 
service providers, such as teachers. In education, UNE (Union Nacional de 
Educadores), the teachers’ union, is particularly strong” (Project 087831, 
Ecuador).
  “The project does not include controversial aspects, nevertheless, the 
education sector is characterized by a large number of teachers’ unions 
that defend their corporate interests and make reform implementation 
difficult. For example, recurrent strikes negatively impact the school 
year duration and the quality of learning in addition to preventing the 
implementation of necessary reforms. In addition, unions might oppose 
that the Government-set learning objectives for their classes since this 
might be deemed as interference in their work and autonomy. Also, 
the Project will implement tools to monitor teachers’ absenteeism and 
teaching practices that may incur resistance” (Project 133333, Senegal).
Conversely, in other cases, unions are depicted in a more favourable way, with 
documents remarking on their positive contribution to the education system, noting 
their usefulness as agents to fight against corruption (Project 086294, Democratic 
Republic of the Congo), reliable sources of information (Project 111304, Guinea), 
facilitators of public forums allowing for discussions among teachers concerned by 
in-service teacher training (Project 120738, The Gambia), part of the entity intending 
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to organise in-service training (Project 126408, Uruguay), or key stakeholders in 
nationwide awareness campaigns building consensus on the elimination of repetition 
rates and introducing new assessment procedures (Project 075964, Cameroon). In some 
cases, unions are reported to even be aligned with educational authorities: 
  “Both the MEST [Ministry of Education, Science and Technology] and 
teachers’ unions agree that this reform should have three main goals: 
(i) the introduction of a consistent licensing scheme for teachers; (ii) 
decompression of the salary scale; and (iii) the raising of the average wage” 
(Project 102174, Kosovo).
  “Teacher and student union representatives were particularly vocal in their 
support for major changes in the system” (Project 079226, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina). 
In essence, unions are only occasionally discussed in some detail in the lending projects 
of the World Bank. When they are considered, they are frequently regarded as a risk or 
barrier to take into consideration – although their complicity or potential collaboration 
is celebrated. 
3.3. Main policy interventions
3.3.1. “Qualifying” teachers
When Among the different policy measures stipulated or supported by the grants and 
loans funded by the World Bank, those addressing teacher training are by far the most 
frequently prescribed. Three-quarters (77.9 per cent) of the projects establish actions 
directed to strengthen, improve, or extend the provision of pre-service and in-service 
training. In fact, this category accommodates a noticeable variety of interventions and 
lines of action. Notwithstanding this, all these interventions are noticeably distinct 
from those oriented toward a deregulation of teacher education (accelerated training 
programmes, flexibilisation of entry paths). Hence, policies on teacher training include 
support for a strengthened or expanded pre-service teacher education, or support 
for in-service teacher training schemes for qualified teachers. Many of the teacher 
training programmes aim at improving teachers’ knowledge or skills, usually under a 
specified theme or with an explicit goal, such as the incorporation of a competency 
based curriculum, child-centred pedagogical approaches, local or foreign languages, 
use of ICT and learning materials, inclusive education, special needs students, 
context-sensitive curriculum, or delivery models, etc. It should be noted that, in this 
analysis, in-service teacher training schemes operating as accelerated programmes for 
underqualified teachers have been classified under a separate category (see below). 
Given the internal diversity and the lack of detail in some projects, however, the 
teacher training focus of the World Bank’s lending activity does not necessarily indicate 
support for a teacher professionalisation agenda. A better proxy for the identification 
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of a professionalisation agenda could be the establishment or upward revision of 
recruitment standards, on the basis of professional or academic qualifications18. Up 
to 16.8 per cent of the projects aim at making the entrance to the profession more 
selective, setting up more stringent conditions to join the pool of teachers, or at least 
establishing standards that have to be attained during training (as a condition for 
teacher appointments or accreditation).
However, policies recommending the upward revision of requirements to enter the 
profession seem to be especially the case for the more deregulated education systems, 
such as those with significant participation by the private sector, strong forms of SBM, 
or a widespread use of contract teachers or community/locally hired teachers. The 
borrowers of these programmes are countries like Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Nepal. In 
these countries, the certification systems that the World Bank promotes aim to work 
as a compensatory measure (i.e. a sort of ex-ante control to avoid highly unprepared 
teachers from being part of the system), rather than as a measure to promote 
excellence and professionalisation. Among other measures, these projects support 
the development of a merit- or test-based teacher selection criteria (in occasions 
with higher weightage for graduate teachers) directed to create a pool of (potential) 
contract teachers suitable to be contracted by communities or private schools, or the 
establishment of competency levels/minimum qualifications that have to be attained 
during pre-service teacher education for appointment as teacher.
In Bangladesh, for instance, and in light of patronage-based recruitment in non-
government secondary schools managed by SMCs, Project 077789 establishes the 
creation of an autonomous Teachers’ Registration and Certification Agency (NTRCA) 
to ensure a transparent recruitment procedure and avoid the selection of poorly 
prepared individuals as a consequence of political pressure: 
  “The main function of this agency will be to screen, and certify a pool of 
qualified teachers for non-government schools. All schools that receive 
an MPO [Monthly Pay Order]19  will have to recruit new teachers from 
the pool selected by the agency (…). The certification will be based on 
academic qualifications and a standardized examination conducted on 
an annual basis. The list of certified teachers will be published and made 
available to all schools. SMCs/GBs will still retain the authority and 
flexibility to recruit teachers, but these teachers will have to be selected 
from the pre-qualified pool” (Project 077789, Bangladesh).
18  Other measures, such as more selective teacher training schemes or additional classroom expe-
rience during pre-service teacher education (only if supervised and excluding probation periods 
and training schemes based on the direct participation), turn out to be rather marginal – being 
stipulated in 2.3 per cent (two projects) and 3.2 per cent (four projects) of the projects respectively. 
Similarly, the transfer of teacher training to higher education institutions can only be found in 1.6 
per cent (two projects).
19  MPO are subvention grants currently financing 90 per cent of the salary of the non-governmental 
teachers and employees of all recognised educational institutions. 
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Similarly, in Nepal, where teachers are hired and fired by SMCs, Project 113441 
establishes that: 
  “Teachers will be recruited at the local level from among the licensees 
as per the guidelines provided by the central level. The minimum 
qualifications for teachers will be upgraded to higher secondary education 
for basic education and M.Ed. or Master’s degree qualifications with 
relevant teacher preparation course for secondary level”. 
In Punjab (Pakistan), in turn, Project 102608 contemplates the development of a 
system for teacher accreditation, certification and licensing: “The Project will provide 
support to the Government of Punjab’s Technical Task Force on Teacher Certification, 
Licensing and Accreditation, comprising practitioners from the public and private 
sectors”. Project 090346 contemplates the development of a merit-based teacher 
selection criteria with higher weightage for graduate teachers directed to create a 
pool of (potential) contract teachers.
3.3.2. The need for flexibility and the emergence of a new contract
Also in relation to teachers’ preparation, but with a quite different orientation, 
alternative teacher education programmes are supported by 13.7 per cent of the 
projects. They include accelerated pre-service training programmes and, more 
frequently, on-the-job teacher training programmes for underqualified teachers already 
in the profession. These programmes lead to teacher certification or to their recognition 
as “regular” teachers. In The Gambia, for instance, Project 077903 establishes a pilot 
experience providing “certification possibilities for unqualified teachers at a par with 
the certification of those graduating from Gambia College”. 
Another example can be found in Mali, where the World Bank’s Project 093991 
supports a 60-day in-service training for the certification of 3,000 community school 
teachers: “About 3,000 teachers, out of the 6,600 community school teachers who 
are not certified, already have the academic level to become professional teachers. 
They will receive an accelerated training of 60 days in the teacher Training Institutes 
to get the teaching skills and the level to be certified. After certification their salary 
will be increased out of the national budget”.
Similarly, in Indonesia, Project 097104 funds the:
  “Development of a mechanism for undertaking an eligibility examination 
to gain accelerated access to certification. The regulations specify that 
teachers will be able to take a special eligibility exam, which, if they pass 
it, would allow them to go directly to the certification process, regardless 
of their current training”. 
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In Haiti, (Project 106621) outlines that: 
  “To respond to immediate needs and create the ‘quick wins’ that are a 
priority of the Government of Haiti and the Bank, new teachers would 
begin teaching only one year after entering teacher preparation, as 
opposed to the current three year lag (…) recent high school graduates 
would be selected for three years of teacher preparation, consisting of ten 
months in selected public and non-public IFM [Instituts de Formation des 
Maîtres]20  and two years of full time practice teaching in K-6 classrooms”.
And from Malawi’s Project114847: 
  “ODL [Open Distance Learning program] student teachers are recruited 
from rural underserved communities. Entry qualification for ODL students 
are slightly lower as they need a pass in the English examination of the 
Malawi school certificate of education rather than the credit required of those 
undertaking the more conventional course. After a short induction course, 
ODL teachers will be recruited into schools and learn on the job. They will 
work in rural schools with poor teacher pupil ratios”.
In fact, these alternative teacher training programmes are closely connected to the 
flexibilisation of entry paths heavily emphasised in some of the World Bank knowledge 
products. In contrast to those versions of flexibilisation relying on the attraction of 
skilled professionals, the alternative pathways identified in the reviewed lending 
projects appear to encourage or perpetuate the recruitment of local underqualified 
teachers, usually in underserved areas or regions with an already high presence of 
uncertified teachers in the profession (and closely connected to the recruitment of 
contract teachers or para-teachers). Conversely, the establishment of more orthodox 
versions of flexibilisation (i.e. directed to attract individuals trained in other disciplines, 
a la programmes like Teach For America) was only outlined explicitly in a single project:
  “A 12 months pre-service training will be offered to bachelor degree 
holders who have the potential to teach specialized subjects in FDS [Full 
Day Schooling] schools. IT courses will be offered following the IT modules 
developed by PDTP [Primary Teacher Development Project]” (Project 
091747, Vietnam).
Also falling within a deregulation agenda, strong forms of SBM with teachers’ 
accountability mechanisms appear with some frequency within the World Bank’s 
lending projects. In this study, the authors have only considered those SBM schemes 
involving some form of community or school councils’ control over teachers (i.e. 
monitoring teachers’ performance and/or attendance, or taking staffing decisions). 
20  In English, Teacher Preparation Institutes.
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These measures are stipulated in 19.1 per cent of the projects. Frequently, SBM projects 
involve the use of contract teachers – particularly when school or community councils 
are made responsible for hiring and firing decisions. 
Overall, 17.6 per cent of the projects support the use of contract teachers, para-
teachers, community teachers or, more generally, teachers with a status different from 
civil servants (employed on a temporary basis, whether by education authorities or by 
school or local committees). Frequently, these schemes dovetail with the promotion 
of SBM arrangements, and seem to be particularly advanced in South Asia. The 
percentage of projects supporting the use of contract teachers rises to 48.3 per cent 
in South Asia. Up to 62.1 per cent of the projects in the region establish or reinforce 
mechanisms making teachers accountable to parents or communities (see Box 4 
below). Conversely, in other regions, these types of schemes are supported by a very 
marginal number of the projects.
BOX 4. TEACHERS WITHIN THE NEPALI SBM REGIME
When it comes to strong forms of SBM and the use of contract teachers as part 
of a deregulation agenda, Nepali projects appear to work as flagship operations, 
being one setting where the World Bank has most actively promoted the 
consolidation of these reforms since the early 2000s. The advancement of 
SBM has to be understood as the consolidation of a previously established 
reform - the passing of the Seventh Amendment of the Education Act in 2001. 
The approved legislation contained provisions for the formation of school 
management committees responsible for hiring teachers. And the conversion 
of aided primary schools to Community Managed Schools was incentivised by 
means of financial grants and the guarantee of continued government funding. 
Such a model involves the use of salary grants, whereby teachers are no longer 
supplied by the government but recruited by the communities. The lending 
projects reviewed here reinforce and strengthen these reforms, enhancing the 
management capacity of SMCs, consolidating a strong model of SBM to which 
the World Bank attaches great value: “This reform, which has no precedence 
worldwide, constitutes one of the most radical reforms in school education 
aimed at addressing poor governance of public schools widespread in many 
developing countries” (Project 107558, Nepal). 
In some settings, the World Bank does not actively promote the use of contract 
teachers, but seems to consider them as a natural and even genuine component 
of education systems, and legitimates their presence through its interventions. In 
Madagascar, for instance, one of the components of Project 131945 is a subsidy for 
community teachers. The rationale is as follows: 
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  “This activity will contribute to the payment of salaries for community, 
non-civil servant teachers—those supported through the Parent 
Association (Fikambanan’ny Ray Aman-drenin’ny Mpianatra, FRAM)—
for a limited number of months of the year. The government has been 
subsidizing the salaries of these teachers since 2002 to reduce the direct 
costs of education to families. Since the crisis, it has been a challenge for 
the government to continue paying the subsidy on a timely and regular 
basis, and the gaps had to be filled by parents’ contributions. To ensure 
the continued functioning of the system, while at the same time protecting 
future sustainability and government commitment for teacher salaries, 
donors have been contributing to the payment of these salaries for a 
limited number of months during the year, while the government assured 
the payment for the remaining months.”
Hence, the project funds the contracting of non-civil servant and untrained teachers, 
hired by the communities (as a means to address teacher shortages) and with the 
explicit objective of preserving a particularly fragile form of education provision. 
Similarly, in Malawi, Project 114847 followed a similar rationale and determines that 
“school communities will be allowed to recruit sufficiently qualified auxiliary teachers 
from the local community”. 
These examples show that support for community teachers cannot be automatically 
equalled to a deliberate strategy to promote contract or temporary teachers as part 
of these World Bank projects. Rather, the projects seem to assume the current state 
of affairs (the recruitment of non-civil servant, additional teachers by communities) 
and provide the funds that grant their continuation. Nonetheless, the naturalisation, 
acceptance, and recognition of these teachers’ corps (and the preservation of their use 
as an alternative to regular provision) implicitly contributes to the de-professionalisation 
and the deregulation of teachers’ working conditions.
Performance-based incentives (including bonuses, a widening of salary scales or 
performance-dependent career advancement opportunities) are only moderately 
promoted within the World Bank’s lending activity. Stipulated by 16.8 per cent of the 
projects, incentives are encouraged in particular in East Asia and the Pacific and South 
Asia, where more than one-third of the projects set up some kind of performance-
based rewards21. Bangladesh is a special case where government subsidies for teachers’ 
salaries in privately managed secondary schools are linked to performance criteria 
(consisting of students’ results on standardised tests) within a funding scheme known 
as MPO (see Footnote 19). 
21  Again, this category involves a high level of internal diversity (who is evaluated - teachers, 
schools, the nature of the incentive and what is rewarded). Remarkably, although in most of the 
cases, these incentives are expected to be managed by education authorities (involving a reform of 
salary scales or promotion procedures), community councils are made responsible for the admi-
nistration of the bonuses (see, for instance, Pakistan Project 094086).
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  “The MPO system is being revised to clearly link subventions for 
teachers’ salaries to outcomes on standardized examinations for grades 
10 and 12 (…) It is being proposed that poorly performing schools (with 
less than 40 per cent students passing standardized examinations in 
grades 10 and 12) will be given a two-year period in which to improve 
their performance, failing which the subventions will cease. Well 
performing schools (with greater than 75 percent passing in standardized 
examinations) will have their subventions increased by 20 percent for the 
next two years” (Project 077789, Bangladesh).
 
It is worth noting the dissimilar promotion of different policies within the different 
regions, as shown in Figure 6. More specifically, the advancement of contract teachers, 
SBM and performance-based incentives in South Asia is remarkable compared to 
other regions. As observed in Figures 6, 7, and 8 below, the region accounts for a 
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BOX 5. WATCHING TEACHERS
The establishment of supervision and management systems is a sort of cross-
cutting measure, supported by 57.3 per cent of the projects. The specific 
activities supported as part of these arrangements are quite varied in nature and 
include the establishment of education management cadres, the construction 
of a teacher database, the implementation of a teacher appraisal system and 
the strengthening of inspectorate services. However, besides capacity building 
activities, some projects support more innovative and controlling arrangements. 
This is particularly the case with Project 125958 in Pakistan. In light of the 
“underperformance of service delivery agents”, portrayed as a major concern, 
the project supports government plans to establish “the piloting of the use 
of ICT, specifically the use of smartphones with GPS tracking capability and 
digital cameras for the real-time verification of the presence of teachers at 
school”. Albeit rather anecdotal, it is worth taking into consideration the 
prior experimentation with similar schemes, as in the work of Duflo, Hanna 
and Ryan (2007, 2008, 2010) on attendance-based bonuses involving the 
use of daily and time-stamped photographs to monitor teacher attendance 
(jointly with random inspections). The study enjoys significant diffusion and 
reference, being reviewed by Rogers and Vegas (2009), Lockheed (2014), 
SABER-Teachers and Bruns, Filmer and Patrinos (2011) – which makes it likely 
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Finally, the provision and distribution of teachers also appears to be the focus of 
a number of projects. Hence, different (State-managed) 22 deployment policies, 
including hardship bonuses, incentives to teach particular subjects, revisions of transfer 
criteria, or new criteria for teacher allocation are frequently supported. Specifically, 
these policies are supported in 16.8 per cent of the projects. More broadly speaking, 
supply issues (i.e. the recruitment of additional teachers or the provision of substitute 
teachers) are addressed in 19.18 per cent of the projects. It is worth noting, however, 
that similar to other policies discussed above, most of these projects are concentrated 
in the South Asia region, which account for half of the projects setting up these kinds 
of arrangements. Since the use of contract teachers and strong forms of SBM are 
particularly advanced in this region, the expansion of the teaching force seems likely 
to entail its reshaping – marking a departure from the prevalence of civil servant status 
to new free-market or deregulated schemes.
3.4. Key findings
•  The World Bank’s lending projects devote a great deal of attention to the limitations 
of teacher training schemes in place. Here, issues related to professional development 
and preparation are clearly considered the most urgent point that need to be 
addressed.
•  Limited instruction time also emerges as a central issue. However, and in contrast to 
knowledge products, this is frequently portrayed as the result of elements beyond 
teachers’ control, such as multiple shift schemes.
•  The lack of accountability mechanisms such as performance-based incentives and 
community supervision receive limited attention. Moreover, references to these 
issues appear concentrated in some particular regions. 
•  Teachers’ unions are rarely discussed in depth in lending project documents. When 
addressed, however, they tend to be portrayed as obstacles or factors of risk – 
although their positive contribution is also contemplated. 
•  Most of the projects fund some sort of activity directed at improving teacher training. 
However, more sophisticated professionalisation measures enjoy a rather limited 
attention.  
•  Lines of action favouring the alteration of contractual relationships (SBM, contract 
teachers, and performance-based incentives) enjoy limited support and are especially 
present in the South Asian region’s operations. 
22  The authors do not consider here the support of strong forms of SBM or the use of contract tea-
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4. CONCLUSIONS
4.1. Depiction of teachers in the knowledge products
The World Bank considers teachers as a very important piece in the quality education 
puzzle and, at the same time, says there is significant room for improvement. In the 
articles, reports, and other publications produced by the World Bank since 2000, 
teachers are depicted as a puzzling and problematic entity in educational settings. The 
main conceptions of teachers and teachers’-related problems identified in this review 
can be categorised as follows: 
-  The low-quality culprit: World Bank literature frequently portrays teachers as part 
of the problem concerning quality education that many countries face. Specifically, 
it considers teachers as poor contributors to the quality of education systems, and 
holds them responsible for low levels of student learning. This is the case in one out 
of three of the knowledge products analysed. 
-  The low-effort absentee: Teachers are frequently conceived as rather neglectful or 
disinclined to work. Half of the reviewed knowledge products consider that teachers’ 
perceived lack of effort and engagement in the classroom, voluntary absenteeism, 
or the intentional loss of instruction time are key reasons for low education quality. 
Nonetheless, the degree of teachers’ responsibility for poor performance and non-
attendance is somewhat offset in one-third of the documents, which refer to the impact 
of illness-related issues, second jobs resulting from low salaries, or double-shift schemes. 
-  The unaccountable bureaucrat: The deliberate negligence or intentional under-
performance of teachers is frequently attributed to a lack of accountability 
mechanisms. Four of every ten reviewed documents (43.8 per cent) allude to the 
harmful effects of a lack of performance-based incentives and uniform labour 
conditions for teachers. Among other effects, it is assumed that the lack of incentive 
systems in place is highly demotivating for teachers. Furthermore, one-quarter of the 
documents draw attention to limited opportunities for parents, schools, and local 
communities to voice their concerns with regard to teachers’ misbehaviour. 
-  Ill-prepared and untrained: Both the presence of untrained teachers and insufficient 
or poor quality teachers’ preparation are mentioned by nearly one-quarter of the 
documents. Nonetheless, in knowledge products, limitations of teacher training 
receive some degree of attention, but to a lesser extent than accountability related 
explanations.
-  Teachers’ unions as reform obstacles: Teachers’ unions receive only limited attention. 
They are mentioned in half of the documents, but frequently as a secondary actor. 
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    However, when discussed in some detail, teachers’ unions are portrayed as obstacles 
to education reform processes and, consequently, as opposed to public interest. 
The policy recommendations affecting teachers that are placed at the centre of the 
World Bank’s publications are closely related to the main problems and conceptions 
of teachers detailed above. They are:
-  Performance-based incentives: This is the most frequently recommended policy 
option, being promoted in half of the publications. Incentives schemes are expected 
to motivate teachers and are regarded as a particularly cost-effective reform – 
especially when compared to input measures such as increased teacher training. 
-  Preference for precarious labour conditions: Both the use of contract teachers and 
the implementation of SBM schemes involving a significant degree of control on 
staffing related-decisions enjoy noticeable support in the World Bank’s knowledge 
products, with contract teachers recommended by 22.6 per cent of the documents 
and SBM schemes by 34.38 per cent. Similarly, policies facilitating dismissals are also 
considered by one-quarter of the documents. Ultimately, further job insecurity is 
also expected to work as a powerful incentive for teachers.
-  On a separate note, the improvement of teacher training is also a recurrent recom-
mendation (it appears in one-third of the documents). Although other policies 
indicative of a professionalisation agenda, such as the raising of hiring standards, are 
present in some documents, they are less frequently recommended by the World Bank. 
4.2. Treatment of teachers in lending projects
In a similar way to the World Bank’s publications, the lending projects of this 
international organisation identify various teacher related issues, although not all of 
them receive the same attention. The most frequently cited issues are:
-  Challenges to teaching are at the centre of the World Bank’s lending projects. 
Limitations affecting teachers’ training are mentioned by 52.9 per cent of the 
projects. These include the inadequate content of teacher education, the scarcity of 
opportunities for professional development, and poorly equipped institutions. In the 
same vein, the presence of underqualified teachers in the profession also receives 
attention, jointly with the use of inadequate or obsolete pedagogical practices 
(referred to respectively in 27.7% and 29.4% of the documents). 
-  Pedagogical issues are also very present in the Bank’s lending portfolio. Nonetheless, 
these issues are more frequently discussed in relation to middle-income and emerging 
economies (Europe and Central Asia, East Asia and the Pacific), suggesting that 
teaching and learning dimensions are more often addressed where supply and access 
issues are considered to be already tackled.
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-  The impact of limited instruction time (as a result of short school days, premature 
school closures and teacher non-attendance, inter alia) is frequently mentioned 
(referred to in 41.2 per cent of the lending projects). More specifically, teacher 
absenteeism also receives a significant degree of attention (mentioned by 33.6 per 
cent of the projects). However, 65.3 per cent of those projects mentioning limited 
instruction time explain these limitations, to some extent, as a consequence of 
multiple shift schemes, involuntary absences, or other factors that tend to dissociate 
the problem from teachers’ effort or misbehaviour. 
-  When it comes to teacher accountability and management, limitations resulting 
from a poorly developed institutional infrastructure receive significant attention 
(31.1 per cent), while references to the negative effects of job stability, in contrast 
to the knowledge projects, are hardly mentioned. The absence or limitations of 
performance-based incentives and community supervision receive only limited 
attention (14.35 per cent and 10.9 per cent respectively). 
-  Corruption in hiring and deployment practices is mentioned by a limited number of 
projects (13.4 per cent). However, such an issue seems to affect particularly those 
countries where strong forms of SBM and contract teachers’ reforms are at a more 
advanced stage (such as Bangladesh and Pakistan). 
-  Teachers’ unions are only addressed tangentially and are very rarely discussed in 
depth within lending projects. However, they are frequently regarded in negative 
terms or at least as a risk factor to take into account when implementing a project 
involving educational reform (22 out of 35 references point in this direction, i.e. 68.9 
per cent of the projects discussing unions). The potential positive contribution of 
teachers’ unions is mentioned less frequently, but it is also taken into account quite 
often (14 projects – 40 per cent). 
The World Bank’s lending projects analysed here aim to address one or more of the 
teachers’-related issues just mentioned. The main policies and programmes advanced 
for this purpose, by order of importance, include: 
-  Professional teacher training: Activities directed to improve teacher training 
are contemplated by most of the projects (77.9 per cent). Conversely, other 
professionalisation measures such as the upward revision of hiring or certification 
standards are less frequently stipulated (16.8 per cent), and seem to be particularly 
mentioned in relation to deregulated education systems. 
-  Contract teachers: Alternative training programmes (accelerated pre-service 
education or on-the-job training for unqualified teachers) are also recommended by 
some projects (13.7 per cent), while the flexibilisation of entry paths to the profession 
as envisaged by knowledge products (e.g. relying on professionals trained in other 
disciplines) is only marginally approached. 
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-  School-based management: The implementation of strong forms of SBM and contract 
teachers are supported by a relatively limited number of projects (19.1 per cent and 
17.6 per cent respectively). However, those arrangements are distinctly promoted 
in South Asia, where SBM receives support in 48.3 per cent of projects with contract 
teachers receiving support in 62.1 per cent of projects, as shown in Figure 10.
4.3. Conceptions of general teacher policy: a comparative analysis
Looking at the teacher conceptions and policy preferences found in both the 
publications and projects of the World Bank, it becomes evident that the different types 
of documents offer varying points of view on the same teachers’-related themes and 
are informed by different perspectives, ultimately advocating for different (and even 
opposing) policy options. Hence, it is possible to identify significant inconsistencies 
in the diagnosis included in knowledge products and lending projects, as well as in 
relation to the policy agendas fostered by these two groups of documents 23 . Figures 
8, 9 and 10 illustrate these differences well:
23 Beyond the gap between knowledge products and lending projects, it is also worth noting that 
each of these two genres show their own internal inconsistencies as a consequence of the “internal 
diversity” among the pool of researchers and employees of the Bank. Far from constituting a unitary 
or monolithic body of research, the different documents focus on a number of issues quite diverse in 
nature and, more importantly, adopt different points of view on the same themes and are informed 
by different perspectives, eventually advocating for different (and ever competing) policy options. 
However, and as recalled by Steiner-Khamsi (2012: 4) a systems theory based approach reiterates the 
need to think of the Bank as a social system with its own regulatory regime and a set of shared beliefs 
and preferences. Needless to say, it does not follow from this approach that all the researchers or WB 
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In fact, and taking note of the four competing teacher policy agendas advanced in 
the Introduction, a manifest disconnect between talk and action emerges within 
knowledge products and lending projects. On the one hand, and as Figure 13 and, 
particularly, Figure 15 show, knowledge products seem to express a certain preference 
for managerialist or neo-bureaucratic reforms, in coherence with a diagnosis of 
teachers’ issues that emphasises their lack of effort. Following Le Grand’s (2003) 
theorisation of public servant attitudes, teachers would very much resemble “knaves” 
– self-interested individuals who are unlikely to “work hard” and are nor driven by 
genuine altruistic motivations neither concerned with students’ learning nor future 
opportunities. These premises, in fact, fit within a principal-agent model 24  that 
explicitly informs several of the reviewed documents. Thus, knowledge products show 
a clear preference for those policies designed to incentivise a (more) striving attitude 
among teachers. In a way, these documents seem to assume that effectiveness is a 
question of “motivation” and that underperformance can be explained by excessive 
labour security and uniform conditions – which ultimately would foment idle attitudes. 
Conversely, lending projects seem to be more supportive of a professionalisation agenda 
and place greater importance on activities aimed at improving teachers’ training. Since 
such documents assume that the source of the problem is not the lack of effort but the 
inadequacy or scarcity of teacher training, the logical solution lies in the strengthening 
of the skills of the teaching force. Moreover, lending projects are characterised by a 
distinct approach that tends to dissociate quality limitations from teachers’ decisions 
or attitudes – limited teacher time, for instance, is not portrayed as a consequence of 
voluntary absenteeism but as the result of factors beyond teachers’ control. Furthermore, 
whereas the absence of accountability mechanisms is underscored by a significant 
number of the knowledge products, and job stability is frequently regarded as harmful, 
24 In a public service provision framework, the principal-agent problem refers to the difficulties met 
by the State (principal) when it comes to monitor public services providers (agents) and ensure they 
deliver the expected outcomes, as a consequence of different factors, including asymmetric informa-
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FIGURE 14  -  Most frequently reported teacher-related issues
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such an approach is less frequent in lending projects. Differences in the set starting 
premises also explain the divergence of approaches to “alternative pathways” to the 
profession. For instance, contract teachers are related to premises that say that teachers’ 
underperformance is a consequence of a “relaxed” attitudes that can be altered by 
less job security. However, this is not the predominant perspective in lending products. 
Particularly illustrative of this gap between talk and action is how teachers are linked 
to educational problems in each type of document. Whereas knowledge products 
tend to portray teachers as part of the problem to be solved (low levels of student 
learning or, more generally, poor education quality), lending projects devote more 
attention to teachers as agents that are part of the solution to the most significant 
educational problems.
This gap between what the World Bank “says” (in publications) and what the World 
Bank “does” (in lending projects) has already been identified in relation to other 
education policy areas such as education privatisation. According to Mundy and 
Menashy (2014: 421), despite the World Bank being one of the most active promoters 
of education privatisation through its publications, research and international seminars, 
“only seven of the countries receiving Bank lending for K-12 education have projects 
that include a component of funding for private provision of services”25 . This policy- 
practice decoupling is similar to the evidence in relation to teachers’ policies. In this 
case, the World Bank discourse can also be considered as more “neoliberal” (i.e. closer 
to a teachers’ flexibilisation and/or cost-efficiency agenda) than its interventions on the 
ground (with many projects including elements that could be considered as closer to a 
professionalisation agenda). It is paradigmatic of this decoupling that numerous lending 
projects with teachers’ components try to reverse the implementation of SBM policies 
(due to the perverse effects and misbehaviour that this policy has generated in real 
situations), despite this being a prevalent policy concept in the World Bank’s discourse. 
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This and other disconnections between talk, decisions, and actions in the Bank need to be 
seen as a functional response as this organisation attempts to manage conflicting external 
agendas arising from the demands of client governments, and the internal institutional 
preferences reproduced by Bank officials (Mundy and Verger 2015). Thus, it is feasible 
to consider that many of the World Bank’s clients might be reluctant to adopt the sort of 
managerial policies on teachers designed by the Bank’s experts in Washington DC because 
they know that the nature of the problems of their teachers’ force is of a very different 
nature. To many developing countries, it is probably more urgent, realistic and politically 
rewarding to invest their scarce resources in training and attracting a higher number 
of qualified teachers to their education systems. This is preferable to implementing, 
for instance, sophisticated incentive schemes for teachers or potentially contentious 
accountability mechanisms involving the community or other types of stakeholders to 
control teachers’ labour. 
Overall, considering the decline in the demand of the WB education sector lending 
(Jones, 2006) and the need for a diversification of borrowing countries (with an increasing 
presence of middle-income countries with a more discriminating attitude, but also countries 
that are very different in terms of development trajectories, political realities and conflict 
situations), it is possible to think that the Bank could now be more inclined to respond 
to their client priorities, and more reluctant to impose a blueprinted neoliberal agenda 
which, on many occasions, is far from falling within their clients’ preferences. In short, 
the increasing diversification of clients’ characteristics and needs together with the fact 
that the WB’s lending activity is increasingly client-driven may explain the discarding of 
controversial policy options privileged in its knowledge products. As observed previously 
by Mundy and Verger (2015): 
 “ Some aspects of the agenda have clearly been rejected by borrowers and 
(often after civil society contestation) by some powerful members (…) 
Clearly, borrowing governments play an important role in conditioning 
the character of Bank activities, and their preferences are at least partly 
responsible for disjunctures between the Bank’s agenda-setting role and its 
practical engagement in the financing of educational development” (Mundy 
and Verger 2015: 16-17). 
It is also possible to think that the lack of a technical capacity and institutional 
infrastructure (i.e. inspectorate services in place, trained officials, an operative 
communication and administration network, etc.) that is evident in most low-income 
countries where the Bank operates makes impracticable the implementation of complex 
managerialist and accountability systems involving a broad range of educational 
stakeholders,. As recently observed by the Independent Evaluation Group of the 
World Bank (IEG), the increasing degree of complexity in education projects’ design in 
relation to the level of borrowers’ political commitment and capacity creates significant 
problems in implementation and therefore in the delivery of results (IEG, 2011). In 
other words, material and technical limitations could shift the order of priorities of the 
World Bank’s operations on the ground and make not only the clients but also Bank 
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officials operating in different regions sceptical of the feasibility of the often complex 
policies designed by the WB intelligentsia from the Washington DC headquarters. 
In spite of existing discordances between the knowledge and the lending products, 
the review of the whole corpus of documents allows for the identification of some 
general trends or cross-cutting assumptions. First of all, the perspective adopted by 
a number of documents regarding teachers’ unions is particularly remarkable. When 
addressed with a certain depth, unions tend to be regarded in quite negative terms 
(as an antagonistic force to educational reform and progress) or, alternatively, as 
organisations appreciated only on condition of displaying a cooperative and compliant 
(docile) attitude. Only rarely are they regarded as equal interlocutors with legitimate 
policy preferences and likely to contribute to education quality on their own terms – 
and not as collaborators and agents open to “tolerating” education reforms. 
As another cross-cutting trend, it is noteworthy that teachers are primarily conceived 
of as (human) resources, which accounts for the emphasis on the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the proposed educational reforms. Pervasive references to and concern 
about the proportion of the education budget allocated to teacher salaries can be 
similarly found in the two sets of documents. This is quite paradoxical if it is taken 
into account that references to low salaries – and/or delayed pay – for teachers is a 
recurrent issue in the Bank publications and in its lending projects (see Figure 11). 
However, and although low or delayed salaries receive some attention, the issue is 
rarely addressed in a consistent way through policy proposals.
In fact, the existence of these second-order or overlooked questions underlines the 
importance of what is disregarded and omitted. Beyond the actual positioning of 
the Bank regarding a particular subject, the very “investigation questions” and the 
definition of the research agenda are quite informative of the priorities and orientation 
of the organisation. It is significant, for instance, that teachers’ welfare tends to be an 
issue that is neglected from both the World Bank policy agenda and its operational 
practices. Similarly, it is quite revealing that knowledge products rarely elaborate on 
teacher training or discuss the issue in some depth. 
Finally, it is worth noting that the results suggest an important degree of regional 
variation. Particularly in what concerns lending projects, regional divisions appear to 
behave quite differently – not only in respect to the “diagnosis of the problems” 26  but 
also regarding the main policy prescriptions. The most telling example of this dissimilarity 
in policy preferences is the promotion of contract teachers, SBM, and performance-based 
incentives, which seems to be particularly relevant in the South-Asian region, but not 
so much in other regions. Likewise, the approach to teachers’ unions varies noticeably 
among different regions. Here, Sub-Saharan teachers’ unions appear to be the object 
of an (exceptionally) positive and benevolent perspective on behalf of the Bank due to 
the potential role they can play in the implementation of educational reforms. Available 
evidence on this and other related themes is limited yet but indicates possible avenues for 
further empirical research and invites researchers to work further on this important matter.
26 At the end of the day, diversity concerning “problems to be solved” is an expectable result given the 
(already discussed) growing diversity in terms of development trajectories of the borrowing countries. 
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 Appendix 1. Synthesis Matrix

















High absence rates 2 12,5 24 75,00
Lack of effort 0 0 15 46,88
"Extenuating circumstances" 3 18,75 11 34,38
Inadequate in-school supervision 9 56,25 5 15,63
Poor community or parental supervision 0 0 9 28,13
Poor administrative or institutional management 12 75 7 21,88
Absence of incentives and permanent tenure 11 68,75 14 43,75
Poor teacher education 11 68,75 8 25,00
Unqualified teachers 8 50 9 28,13
Attraction of less-prepared candidates 8 50 7 21,88
Inadequate pedagogical practices and weak subject knowledge 1 6,25 4 12,50
Critical subject shortages 14 87,5 2 6,25
Lack of female teachers 2 12,5 4 12,50
Uneven distribution 15 93,75 7 21,88
Teacher shortages 5 31,25 7 21,88
Proportion of education budgets allocated to teacher salaries 0 0 11 34,38
Inefficient use of resources 1 6,25 7 21,88
Corruption 0 0 5 18,76
Inadequate labour conditions 3 18,75 10 31,25
Policy solutions
Improved training 5 71,43 11 34,38
More selective teacher training 2 28,57 4 12,50
Extended classroom experience 2 28,57 5 15,63
Peer-to-peer support and networking 2 28,57 7 21,88
Raising hiring standards 0 0,00 5 15,63
Contract teachers 0 0,00 8 25,00
Alternative entries to the profession 2 28,57 5 15,63
School-based management and community control 0 0,00 11 34,38
Policies facilitating dismissals 2 28,57 7 21,88
Performance-based incentives 5 71,43 16 50,00
Institutional development and capacity building 6 85,71 9 28,13
Empowered school principals 0 0,00 7 21,88
Deployment policies: hardship bonuses 5 71,43 6 18,75
Increased teacher/student ratio 0 0,00 3 9,38
Multigrade teaching 0 0,00 5 15,63
Teachers welfare 1 14,29 6 18,75
Additional recruitment 1 14,29 4 12,50
Female teachers 0 0,00 2 6,25
Revision of time allocations 3 42,86 2 6,25
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References to low instructional time 49 41,2 66,7 5,6 23,3 40,0 68,0 51,9
>> References to teacher absences 40 33,6 22,2 0,0 13,3 40,0 68,0 48,1
>> Extenuating circumstances explaining limited instructional time 32 26,9 66,7 5,6 20,0 10,0 32,0 37,0
Limitations concerning teacher education 63 52,9 44,4 72,2 36,7 70,0 52,0 55,6
Presence of underqualified teachers 33 27,7 44,4 5,6 26,7 10,0 36,0 37,0
Inadequate or obsolete pedagogical practices 35 29,4 44,4 44,4 26,7 20,0 24,0 25,9
Weak subject matter knowledge 10 8,4 11,1 0,0 13,3 0,0 0,0 18,5
Poor community supervision 13 10,9 0,0 0,0 6,7 0,0 44,0 0,0
Absent or ineffective performance-based incentives 17 14,3 33,3 22,2 10,0 10,0 24,0 0,0
Ineffective government monitoring, poor institutional develop-
ment
37 31,1 11,1 11,1 16,7 40,0 60,0 37,0
Corruption affecting teachers management 16 13,4 0,0 5,6 6,7 0,0 36,0 14,8
Relative importance of salary-related expenditures (mention of) 42 35,3 44,4 55,6 16,7 50,0 32,0 37,0
Inefficient use of resources: low ratios or workloads, high salaries, etc. 31 26,1 44,4 61,1 10,0 40,0 0,0 33,3
Absolute or relative teacher shortages (including specialist teachers) 64 53,8 88,9 27,8 36,7 40,0 48,0 88,9
>> Uneven and inadequate distribution of teachers 53 44,5 88,9 33,3 23,3 40,0 32,0 74,1
>> Absolute shortages, high ratios 25 21,0 11,1 5,6 13,3 0,0 32,0 40,7
>> Critical subject shortages or lack of specialists 15 12,6 11,1 11,1 3,3 0,0 16,0 25,9
Lack of female teachers 15 12,6 11,1 0,0 0,0 30,0 20,0 22,2
Better-educated individuals not attracted by the profession 14 11,8 11,1 27,8 0,0 0,0 12,0 18,5
Low or irregular pay or poor labour protection 34 28,6 44,4 55,6 13,3 0,0 20,0 40,7

















Extended or improved teacher training 102 77,9 72,7 84,2 77,4 90,0 75,9 74,2
More selective teacher training 3 2,3 0,0 0,0 3,2 0,0 3,4 3,2
Extended classroom experience during teacher training 4 3,1 9,1 0,0 3,2 0,0 0,0 6,5
Transfer of teacher training to higher education institutions 2 1,5 0,0 0,0 0,0 20,0 0,0 0,0
Upward revision of certification process or hiring standards 22 16,8 9,1 15,8 9,7 20,0 44,8 0,0
Alternative teacher education programmes: accelerated pre-ser-
vice TT schemes or on-the-job learning programs/in-service TT 
for underqualified teachers
18 13,7 18,2 0,0 16,1 20,0 17,2 12,9
Use of contract teachers (≠ civil servant status) 23 17,6 0,0 0,0 9,7 20,0 48,3 12,9
Flexibilisation of entry paths (professionals trained in other disciplines) 2 1,5 9,1 0,0 0,0 10,0 0,0 0,0
School-based management (w. teacher management/control provisions) 25 19,1 0,0 0,0 12,9 10,0 62,1 6,5
Performance-based incentives: bonuses, performance-related 
pay, widening of salary scale differentiation
22 16,8 27,3 15,8 6,5 0,0 31,0 16,1
Establishment of (govt. managed) monitoring systems: deve-
lopment or strengthening of inspectorates, capacity building, 
training of officials, EMIS
75 57,3 27,3 36,8 54,8 90,0 69,0 61,3
Deployment policies: hardship bonuses; incentives to teach 
critical subjects, redeploying of teaching force; reconsideration of 
transfer criteria
22 16,8 9,1 10,5 9,7 30,0 20,7 22,6
72
E D U C A T I O N  I N T E R N A T I O N A L
Higher teacher/students ratios; optimisation 9 6,9 9,1 31,6 0,0 0,0 0,0 6,5
Competitive and/or punctual payment of salaries, improved 
labour conditions
12 9,2 0,0 15,8 6,5 10,0 6,9 12,9
Additional recruitment and/or provision of substitute teachers 26 19,8 9,1 0,0 19,4 20,0 44,8 12,9
Incentives for woman to enter pre-service training or the 
profession
10 7,6 0,0 0,0 0,0 10,0 17,2 12,9
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Appendix 3. List of Lending Projects
PROJECT IDENTIFICATION   COUNTRY         AREA
 P091747 Vietnam East Asia Pacific
 P085260 Vietnam East Asia Pacific
 P094063 Philippines East Asia Pacific
 P095873 Timor-Leste East Asia Pacific
 P096328 Mongolia East Asia Pacific
 P097104 Indonesia East Asia Pacific
 P120890 Timor-Leste East Asia Pacific
 P070668 Cambodia East Asia Pacific
 P111059 Mongolia East Asia Pacific
 P118494 Lao PDR East Asia Pacific
 P118931 Philippines East Asia Pacific
 P078976 Kyrgyz Republic Europe Central Asia
 P084597 Montenegro Europe Central Asia
 P086671 Croatia Europe Central Asia
 P090340 Moldova Europe Central Asia
 P094042 Uzbekistan Europe Central Asia
 P098217 Georgia Europe Central Asia
 P102117 Azerbaijan Europe Central Asia
 P102174 Kosovo Europe Central Asia
 P107772 Armenia Europe Central Asia
 P107845 Uzbekistan Europe Central Asia
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 P113350 Kyrgyz Republic Europe Central Asia
 P143060 Georgia Europe Central Asia
 P066149 Turkey Europe Central Asia
 P127388 Moldova Europe Central Asia
 P129552 Moldova Europe Central Asia
 P129597 Georgia Europe Central Asia
 P077738 Ukraine Europe Central Asia
           P078933    Albania Europe Central Asia
           P079226    Bosnia and Herzegovina Europe Central Asia
PROJECT IDENTIFICATION           COUNTRY                      AREA
  
 P078993 El Salvador Latin America and the Caribbean
 P082908 Colombia Latin America and the Caribbean
 P085851 Mexico Latin America and the Caribbean
 P087831 Ecuador Latin America and the Caribbean
 P089898 Guatemala Latin America and the Caribbean
 P101218 Honduras Latin America and the Caribbean
 P106621 Haiti Latin America and the Caribbean
 P106686 Panama Latin America and the Caribbean
 P107146 Brazil Latin America and the Caribbean
 P107407 Jamaica Latin America and the Caribbean
 P120830 Brazil Latin America and the Caribbean
 P052608 Colombia Latin America and the Caribbean
 P069934 Brazil Latin America and the Caribbean
 P099918 Haiti Latin America and the Caribbean
 P101369 Mexico Latin America and the Caribbean
 P105555 Panama Latin America and the Caribbean
 P106208 Brazil Latin America and the Caribbean
 P111662 Uruguay Latin America and the Caribbean
 P112262 Mexico Latin America and the Caribbean
 P122370 Guatemala Latin America and the Caribbean
 P123151 Peru Latin America and the Caribbean
 P124134 Haiti Latin America and the Caribbean
 P126297 Mexico Latin America and the Caribbean
 P126343 Brazil Latin America and the Caribbean
 P126351 Brazil Latin America and the Caribbean
 P126357 Nicaragua Latin America and the Caribbean
 P126364 El Salvador Latin America and the Caribbean
 P126372 Brazil Latin America and the Caribbean
 P126408 Uruguay Latin America and the Caribbean
 P126452 Brazil Latin America and the Caribbean
 P070963 Argentina Latin America and the Caribbean
 P086994 Djibouti Middle East North Africa
 P089761 Yemen, Rep. Middle East North Africa
 P105036 Jordan Middle East North Africa
 P117838 Morocco Middle East North Africa
 P118187 Lebanon Middle East North Africa
 P120541 Morocco Middle East North Africa
 P133699 Yemen, Rep. Middle East North Africa
 P043412 Morocco Middle East North Africa
 P130853 Yemen, Rep. Middle East North Africa
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 P076185 Yemen, Rep. Middle East North Africa
 P083964 Afghanistan South Asia
 P084580 Sri Lanka South Asia
 P090346 Pakistan South Asia
 P097471 Pakistan South Asia
 P100846 Pakistan South Asia
 P101243 Pakistan South Asia
 P084567 Bangladesh South Asia
 P102541 Bangladesh South Asia
   P102608 Pakistan South Asia
PROJECT IDENTIFICATION   COUNTRY         AREA
 P106161 Bangladesh South Asia
 P106259 Afghanistan South Asia
 P107300 Pakistan South Asia
 P107558 Nepal South Asia
 P113435 Bangladesh South Asia
 P113441 Nepal South Asia
 P113488 Sri Lanka South Asia
 P118445 India South Asia
 P131394 Bangladesh South Asia
 P094086 Pakistan (Baluchistan) South Asia
 P102547 India South Asia
 P118673 India South Asia
 P125610 Nepal South Asia
 P125952 Pakistan South Asia
 P125958 Pakistan South Asia
 P131331 Maldives South Asia
 P074633 Nepal South Asia
 P077789 Bangladesh South Asia
 P097636 Pakistan South Asia
 P124913 Pakistan South Asia
 P086294 Congo, Dem. Rep. Sub-Saharan Africa
 P086875 Namibia Sub-Saharan Africa
 P087479 Kenya Sub-Saharan Africa
 P089254 Senegal Sub-Saharan Africa
 P093991 Mali Sub-Saharan Africa
 P096151 Nigeria Sub-Saharan Africa
 P097325 Uganda Sub-Saharan Africa
 P098956 Burkina Faso Sub-Saharan Africa
 P101232 Uganda Sub-Saharan Africa
 P102262 Tanzania Sub-Saharan Africa
 P106280 Nigeria Sub-Saharan Africa
 P106855 Ethiopia Sub-Saharan Africa
 P110803 Uganda Sub-Saharan Africa
 P111304 Guinea Sub-Saharan Africa
 P114847 Malawi Sub-Saharan Africa
 P114866 Tanzania Sub-Saharan Africa
 P120783 Gambia, The Sub-Saharan Africa
 P133333 Senegal Sub-Saharan Africa
 P122124 Nigeria Sub-Saharan Africa
 P123353 Nigeria Sub-Saharan Africa
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 P125127 Mozambique Sub-Saharan Africa
 P128284 Senegal Sub-Saharan Africa
 P128891 Ethiopia Sub-Saharan Africa
 P083326 Madagascar Sub-Saharan Africa
 P084317 Congo, Rep. Sub-Saharan Africa
 P064557 Burundi Sub-Saharan Africa
 P074132 Nigeria Sub-Saharan Africa
 P075964 Cameroon Sub-Saharan Africa
 P131945 Madagascar Sub-Saharan Africa
 P132617 Chad Sub-Saharan Africa
 P077903 Gambia, The Sub-Saharan Africa




Knowledge product genre / Type of financial product
Teacher-related issues
High absence rates
References to teachers’ absence from classroom during school time, whether 
deliberate (i.e. resulting from “cheating” and with an important component of 
volition) or involuntary (as a consequence of issues beyond their control - see 
“Extenuating circumstances”).
Lack of effort
References to poor teaching as a consequence of idleness during instructional 
hours (as opposed to a hard-working or industrious attitude), including an 
intentional loss of instruction time, a poor use of available material, a deliberate 
neglect of responsibilities, inactivity or lack of engagement when in classroom 
and unofficial “shortenings” of the school day or week.
“Extenuating
circumstances”
References to the impact of factors with a significant impact on teachers’ 
attendance or performance, mitigating the component of intentionality of 
teachers’ absences or poor teaching. Among others, this category would 
contemplate the effect of school location (rural or remote areas), the impact 
of illness-related issues (particularly HIV/AIDS affecting teachers or teachers’ 
relatives), external obligations (such as electoral duties), the need to travel 
to collect salaries or participate in training and the impact of second jobs 
(“moonlighting” resulting from low salaries) or double-shift schemes.
Inadequate in-school 
supervision
References to the poor management of teachers on the part of in-school 
superiors (school head or principals). This category deals with questions 
specifically related to control and monitoring - as opposed to pedagogic support 
and general co-ordination. Hence, it considers only those documents regretting 
the poor or limited role of principals from a “managerialist” approach (as a 
consequence of poor training, inadequate selection of insufficient decision-
making powers). (Generalist comments or observations lacking specificity have 
been excluded here, which probably leads to "conservative" estimations).
Poor community or
parental supervision
References to the poor management of teachers on the part of local 
communities, parents or school communities or councils. The category takes into 
consideration those documents pointing to the lack of effective monitoring or 
control of teachers (and particularly teachers' attendance) as a consequence of 
insufficient decision-making power or "self-perceived" disempowerment (as in 
the case of little-educated families), as well as resulting from insufficient training 
or awareness of responsibilities. 
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Poor administrative or
institutional management
References to the ineffective teacher management on the part of education 
authorities. This category contemplates those comments on poor institutional 
development or capacity as well as the absence of control and monitoring 
systems. Hence (and as opposed to "Absence of incentives and permanent 
tenure") it does not make references to the absence of specific solutions 
to (potential) management problems, but rather to a poorly developed 
administrative infrastructure (ineffective inspection and disciplinary systems) 
and/or generalist comments on "failures of accountability".
Absence of incentives and 
permanent tenure
References on the absence of performance-based incentives (including monetary 
and non-monetary bonuses or rewards), on "flat" salary scales (not affected by 
teachers' performance), on promotions and career advancement not subject to 
performance and on job stability (schemes or dispositions making the dismissal 
of (reportedly) underperforming teachers difficult: open-ended appointments 
and permanent tenure) and criticisms to the civil servant status of teachers. More 
generally, this category includes those products taking a critical stance on the 
labour conditions characteristic of the public sector, considered to have harmful 
effects on the motivation and accountability of teachers.
Poor teacher education
References to the insufficiency and poor quality of pre-service teacher training, 
compounded by poor quality, unavailability or non-mandatory professional 
development, and leading to a scarcely qualified teacher force. This category 
includes comments on the inadequate content and methodologies or teacher 
training, references to ill-prepared teacher educators and to the lack of a proper 
infrastructure; comments on an excessively liberalised sector and on the weak 
coupling with education authorities.
Unqualified teachers
References to the presence of untrained teachers in the profession (or trained 
below the level required by education authorities) or to the lack of a certification 
process delimiting a pool of qualified teachers. The category also includes 
documents containing critical comments on the use of para-teachers or contract 
teachers on the basis of their low levels of qualifications.
Attraction of less-prepared 
candidates 
References to difficulties in attracting better-prepared individuals to the 
profession, whether as a consequence of unselective teacher training 
programmes unable to choose the best candidates or as a consequence of 
unattractive labour conditions or the poor recognition enjoyed by the profession.
Inadequate pedagogical 
practices and weak subject 
knowledge
References to the employment of obsolete or inappropriate methodologies. 
Given the scarcity of allusions to the issues, compounded by the lack of detail of 
the comments, the specific attributes of these inadequate practices are difficult 
to identify.
Critical subject shortages References to critical subject shortages or to the lack of specialists.
Lack of female teachers References to the insufficiency of female teachers.
Uneven distribution
References to the co-existence of shortages in rural or remote areas with 
surpluses in urban or better-off areas or the concentration of low-performing 
teachers in disadvantaged areas as a consequence of inadequate transfer criteria 
or deployment policies.
Teacher shortages
References to an insufficient teaching force as a consequence of attrition rates, a 
low output of training institutions, unattractive labour conditions, etc.
Proportion of education 
budgets allocated to teacher 
salaries
References to high proportion of education budgets allocated to teacher salaries 
or salary related expenditures.
Inefficient use of resources
References to inefficiencies related to low ratios, light workloads, the proportion 
of non-teaching staff, or excessively high salaries
Corruption
References to corruption, misgovernance, rent-seeking or nepotism in hiring 
and/or deploying practices, including mentions of “ghost teachers” (existing 
only on the payroll but not actually teaching in the assigned post).
Inadequate labour
conditions
References to low and/or unpunctual remuneration: salaries depending on 
or topped up by parental or community contributions or the lack of labour 
protection.




Revision of pre-service teacher training and encouragement of professional 
development in order to upgrade teachers’ skills. This category includes those policies 
suggesting a modernisation or strengthening of teacher training programmes, as 
opposed to schemes aiming at accelerating or flexibilising teacher training.
More selective teacher 
training




Requirement of (additional) classroom experience during pre-service training and 
before joining the teaching force.
Peer-to-peer support and 
networking
Programmes establishing forms of collaboration between teachers with similar 
positions within in-school hierarchy (including mentoring and induction 
programmes for novice teachers - not involving probation - and forms of mutual 
support), jointly with collaboration schemes between schools.
Raising hiring standards Establishment or revision of the teaching certification leading to the creation of a pre-qualified teachers’ pool or to a (more) selective licencing process.
Contract teachers
Use of contract teachers, i.e. teachers employed on a temporary basis by means 
of a contract (as opposed to open-ended appointments characteristic of a public 
servant status), usually earning a significantly lower salary. Teachers are expected 
to be hired by education authorities or by local communities.
Alternative entries to the 
profession (KP) /
Accelerated and on-the-job 
training (LP)
Flexibilisation of entry paths to the profession, allowing the employment of 
untrained teachers (or teachers holding credentials below the required level) 
and promoting accelerated or on-the-job teacher training schemes (e.g. systems 
providing minimal pre-service training in combination with in-service training).
School-based management 
and community control
Assignment of decision-making power (regarding teachers) to local communities 
or school councils, by means of strong forms of school-based management or 
the empowerment or training of school committees and local councils. This 
category includes any scheme providing parents or citizen committees with 
significant and increased responsibilities, including hiring and firing teachers or 
monitoring their attendance. 
Policies facilitating dismissals
Advocacy for the creation of a separate teaching service with a status different 
from civil servants, jointly with policies aimed at facilitating the removal of 




Setting up of performance-based incentives, including bonuses and rewards, 
performance-related pay, increased salary scale differentiation and performance-
dependent career advancement opportunities.
Increased government 
monitoring
Improvement or establishment of systems monitoring teachers’ attendance or 
performance, without further detail on the consequences of these assessments 
or surveys. This category also includes recommendations for capacity building 
and institutional development regarding teachers’ management (including the 
strengthening of inspectorates, training of officials, systematisation of data, etc.)
Empowered school
principals
Increased principals’ decision-making power regarding teachers’ management.
Deployment policies:
hardship bonuses
Hardship bonuses directed at ensuring an equitable distribution of teachers.
Increased teacher/
student ratio
Policies directed at increasing the teacher/student ratio. 
Multigrade teaching Establishment, training on or support of multigrade or multisubject teaching.
Teachers’ welfare Policies with an effect on teachers’ welfare, including increased remuneration, punctual payment of salaries, or the protection of labour rights. 
Additional recruitment Programmes aiming at increasing the teaching force or establishing substitution schemes in order to reduce teacher/pupil ratio or to address teacher absences.
Female teachers Incentives for women to enter pre-service training or the profession.
Revision of time allocations Official stipulations on time allocations and consideration of non-teaching tasks.
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